

CURRENT HISTORY

A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs



AFRICA

Somalia: The Wages of Failure	<i>Matthew Bryden</i>	145
Mozambique: The Terror of War, the Tensions of Peace	<i>Robert B. Lloyd</i>	152
The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response	<i>Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar</i>	156
The Lessons of Intervention in Africa	<i>Shawn H. McCormick</i>	162
North Africa: The Limits of Liberalization	<i>Lisa Anderson</i>	167
South Africa: Putting Democracy to Work	<i>Kenneth W. Grundy</i>	172
Stalling Political Change: Moi's Way in Kenya	<i>Frank Holmquist and Michael Ford</i>	177
Africa's Dilemma: European Borders, Contested Rule	<i>Mark N. Katz</i>	182
Book Reviews	<i>On Africa</i>	187
The Month in Review	<i>Country by Country, Day by Day</i>	189



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The international intervention in Somalia was to be, after the Persian Gulf War, one of the defining moments of a new world order—but the preliminary conclusions that have emerged as the intervention begins to wind down are not especially positive: "The international community . . . still has a role to play [in Somalia, but] so far that role has been tragically and wastefully mismanaged; for all its noble objectives, the United Nations Operation in Somalia has been a failure and cause for international shame."

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Somalia: The Wages of Failure

MAR 28 1995

BY MATTHEW BRYDEN

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In July 1992, the first 50 military observers for the United Nations Operation in Somalia arrived to monitor the peace in Mogadishu. In March 1995 the last elements of a multinational UN intervention force that once totaled more than 30,000 troops will retire under the watchful cover of Harrier jets, Cobra gunships, and 3,400 American and Italian troops, leaving the capital city—and the country—once again on the verge of civil war. Though many Somalis recognize the blue helmets' departure as a sign of the world's waning interest in their nation's predicament, few will be sorry to see them go. Far from "Saving Somalia" (as CNN once billed it in its coverage), foreign troops have left behind an angry legacy of incomprehension and violence among the people they came to rescue.

Somalis will remember the international intervention not by its good intentions but by the evidence of its failure. The Somali National University, factories, ministries, and entire residential neighborhoods have been damaged or laid to waste; hundreds of Somali civilians have been killed and injured; Somali political and community leaders have been arrested, detained without charge, or even assassinated—all in the name of the United Nations. Two years of UN-sponsored peace talks have done little to stem the tide of violence, and may even have given the factions in the country new reasons to fight. Whatever successes the UN may have marked on its Somali balance sheet over the past

two years, they pale beside the tally of disappointments.

The ignominious end of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) is more than matched by the discreditable means it employed in arriving there: the UN stands accused by a range of nongovernmental organizations, human rights groups, and Somalis of breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of human rights, and murder. Lesser charges center on UNOSOM's political conduct, including choosing sides in the conflict, the alleged purchase of signatures on peace accords, and dishonesty in reporting on the operation's progress. Stories of rampant corruption and incompetence are commonplace, and to the extent they are true a case can be made that they contributed materially to the operation's ultimate downfall. They also cast doubt on the UN's capacity and determination to uphold its own standards of conduct.

Although the blame for Somalia's misery must be placed squarely on its civil, political, and military leaders, the international community cannot take much pride in its efforts to aid the country. Having helped fuel Somalia's implosion, the international rescue effort was a decidedly sloppy and theatrical way of making amends. No amount of money, no quantity of foreign troops and high-tech military hardware can substitute for effective leadership and organization—qualities UNOSOM lacked. Many UN officials and foreign diplomats have described UNOSOM as the worst UN operation they have ever observed. It should, therefore, not be surprising that despite its unprecedented mandate and resources, it proved an inadequate vehicle for the reconciliation of Somalis and the reconstruction of their state. These goals will be achieved only with time,

MATTHEW BRYDEN, who has lived and worked in Somalia since 1990, has served with the United Nations and Doctors without Borders, and as an adviser to Canadian Ambassador to Somalia Lucie Edwards.

patience, and understanding. With UNOSOM scheduled to withdraw from Somalia by March 31, there may now be room for such virtues to be put to work.

DIVIDED AND DEPENDENT

The sunset of the colonial era left the Somali people arbitrarily divided among five distinct territories—Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and Kenya's North-Eastern province. The Somali state has been at odds with its immediate neighbors over this "nationalities" question ever since. By denying the aspirations of the Somali people to unity, the powers that played midwife to the birth of Somalia in 1960 inadvertently ensured the delivery of an orphan child.

Since becoming an independent state, Somalia has not managed to shake its dependence—economic or political—on foreign aid. From the outset its appetite for assistance exceeded the state's capacity to digest it. Development plans during the 1960s were so ambitious that the government could not even spend the funds it borrowed. Shortly after Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in 1969, the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries began to underwrite the costs of his program of "Scientific Socialism." Somalia's security and armed forces—among the largest and best-equipped in Africa—absorbed much of the budget, while the unwieldy, socialist-style bureaucracy was greatly expanded. Fueled by massive infusions of foreign assistance, the Somali state embarked on a course of heady overdevelopment, its capacity for growth distended to the point where it could only burst.

The bubble did burst—or at least spring a leak—with Somalia's defeat in the war with Ethiopia over Ogaden in 1977 and 1978. Angered by Moscow's support for his Ethiopian adversary, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, Siad Barre jettisoned his Soviet allies and turned Westward to finance his country's now advanced aid habit. Unable to secure from the West the easy terms offered by the Eastern bloc, the government plunged into debt: inflation ballooned, cash was in short supply, and the real value of civil servants' salaries dwindled to virtually nothing. According to a 1993 report compiled by the World Bank, by 1990 "for all intents and purposes the government administration had ceased to function at all." By the time the government collapsed in 1991, the state owed foreign lenders nearly \$2 billion, or 360 percent of GDP—eloquent testimony that Barre had been living on borrowed time.

Nor was donor largesse restricted to loans and grants. Arms were also common currency. Between 1980 and 1990 nearly three-quarters of Somalia's military hardware was contributed by the United States—and this at a time when Somalia's spending on the military as against that on social programs was proportionately the highest in the world. Another, more insidious form of

support for Barre's military establishment arrived, ironically, as "humanitarian" assistance, much of it intended for the enormous refugee population generated by the Ogaden war. Manipulating Somali susceptibility to clanship, Barre was able to buy the loyalty of the refugees—mainly members of his mother's Ogaden clan—with international food and nonfood aid. As armed resistance to the regime made its presence felt throughout the northwestern and central regions of the country, growing numbers of refugees were pressed into military service on behalf of the government, though fed and maintained (and probably armed) at the international community's expense. Most donors were well aware of the ultimate destination of their aid, but this knowledge did not stop the flow.

THE FIGHTING BEGINS

By October 1990 there could be little doubt Siad Barre's 21 years in power were destined to end in violence. The economy was in ruins and war engulfed most of the country outside the capital. More than 50,000 people had already been killed in the northwest in fighting between the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the army. In the central region a bitter struggle between government forces and rebels from the United Somali Congress (USC) threatened to produce the same result, while the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) fought its way through the countryside south and west of Mogadishu. In October 1990 the three rebel groups agreed to bring the regime down by force.

War came to Mogadishu on December 30, 1990. Over the next few weeks the remaining foreigners fled the capital. The last "essential" staff of the United Nations flew out on the second day of 1991 to Nairobi, where most agencies set up temporary offices (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees opted for a sumptuous suite atop the Nairobi Safari Club). The UN Emergencies Unit for Somalia, created the year before to coordinate the world body's response to just such a disaster, was disbanded. Neither the means nor the will existed in the UN to mount a major humanitarian response to the swelling crisis. International assistance for the first year and a half of the civil war was left to the International Committee of the Red Cross and a handful of relief agencies.

While fighting between USC militia and former government forces spread southward from Mogadishu during early 1991, Western governments (with the notable exception of Italy) remained reluctant to become embroiled in Somalia's tortuous politics, contenting themselves with humanitarian assistance. In northern and western Somalia the SNM, emerging victorious from its 10-year struggle against Siad Barre and infuriated by USC leader Mohammed Ali Mahdi's unilateral declaration of a government in Mogadishu, announced on May 18 the establishment of an indepen-

dent republic of Somaliland. Like the war in the south, the declaration of independence met with international indifference.

Nevertheless, in May and June, at the urging of Egypt, Italy, and Saudi Arabia, Somali factions gathered in Djibouti to hammer out a formula for government. Though a number of governments sent observers, the UN was conspicuously unrepresented. The talks, handicapped from the start by the absence of several key parties, nominated Ali Mahdi as Somalia's interim president. Neither the breakaway SNM administration in Somaliland, nor General Mohammed Farah Aidid, the newly elected USC chairman, recognized the conference's decisions. Rather than uniting the country, the Djibouti process accelerated its fragmentation.

After a brief respite during the summer of 1991, by November Mogadishu was again at war. Forces loyal to General Aidid clashed with supporters of "Interim President" Ali Mahdi, and in two months of ferocious street battles and indiscriminate shelling by the two factions of the USC as many as 30,000 people were killed. Despite the media's general lack of interest in the conflict, Somalia's problems had reached dimensions the rest of the world could no longer ignore. In January 1992 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent Undersecretary General James Jonah to meet with both sides to negotiate a truce. Apparently ill-prepared for his trip, Jonah's first intervention was such a failure that he drew the ire of international agencies in Mogadishu for having made their work appreciably more dangerous.

Jonah's second try, in March, was more successful. A cease-fire was concluded between Ali Mahdi and Aidid and a semblance of calm returned to Mogadishu. Unfortunately, the UN was already developing the tunnel vision that would handicap later reconciliation efforts: the struggle for Mogadishu, waning through February and March, was rapidly becoming a sideshow to the far more destructive battles in the countryside. Even as the two camps of the USC made their peace in the capital, fighting continued unabated in the southern and central regions. In April forces loyal to Siad Barre, under the banner of the newly formed Somali National Front (SNF), made a dramatic advance on Mogadishu from their bases in the Gedo region to the west, cutting a swath of destruction. Crops were plundered, wells destroyed, and tens of thousands of people dispossessed by looting and pillage.

His forces freed from the struggle with Ali Mahdi by the recent cease-fire, Aidid sent them to meet Siad Barre's men as they arrived at the town of Afgooye, half an hour's drive from Mogadishu. The subsequent battle, in which USC fighters routed Siad Barre's troops and drove them across the border into Kenya, devastated the area even further, and Aidid's army of "liberation" proved no kinder to the people than the SNF had been. Farther south, toward Kismayu, fighting

between the militia of General Mohammed Said Hersi "Morgan" (Barre's son-in-law) and the combined forces of the USC, SPM, and the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) were laying waste to a broad strip of territory along the coast and up the Juba Valley. As early as March and April 1992, while Mogadishu returned to a state of relative tranquillity, reports by the Red Cross and Doctors without Borders warned of soaring malnutrition in these outlying war-torn areas, and the imminent danger of famine.

Despite these clear warning signs the UN persisted in a dilatory approach to the crisis. In late April Mohammed Sahnoun was dispatched as the secretary general's special representative to head newly created UNOSOM, whose principal task was to be the deployment of a cease-fire monitoring force in the capital. An Algerian diplomat who had served eight years with the Organization of African Unity in Ethiopia, Sahnoun would be the first—and the last—of Boutros-Ghali's envoys to Somalia to have first-hand knowledge of the country and the people. Sahnoun was acutely aware of the complexities of the Somali problem. He entered into a slow process of confidence building with leaders throughout the country, not just in Mogadishu, where Aidid was waxing unenthusiastic about the idea of international military observers. Diplomacy, however, could not address the emerging menace of famine, and even as he wove a framework for reconciliation Sahnoun lashed out at the UN agencies for their inaction in the face of a growing humanitarian crisis. Rather than sitting in Nairobi, he argued, the UN should be urgently developing its operational capacity in the field, working side by side with the Red Cross and other relief organizations. His reproof did not sit well with the UN bureaucracy, and it could not have endeared him to the secretary general, who saw his representative's reproaches as casting aspersions on the entire UN family.

Sahnoun's embarrassing honesty, however, won him points with Somalis, and with the international aid agencies in the field, which could identify with his exasperation. As if to vindicate Sahnoun's censure, a cargo aircraft bearing UN markings discharged an unauthorized cargo for Ali Mahdi—reportedly arms, uniforms, and money—in north Mogadishu. Aidid's suspicions about the UN's plans hardened perceptibly, despite disclaimers from the agencies involved that the aircraft was no longer under contract and the flight was unauthorized. Sahnoun, seeing his patient efforts jeopardized by simple incompetence, denounced the flight and described Aidid's wrath as a reasonable reaction. The maneuver allowed him to keep negotiations for the deployment of 500 peacekeepers on track, despite Aidid's shaken confidence. In October, after Sahnoun had finally persuaded Aidid to accept the 500 and was bargaining for an increase to 3,000, Boutros-Ghali announced—without consulting his envoy—that the increase would occur whether Somali leaders agreed or

not. As one observer noted, "Sahnoun's four months of arduous and fruitful diplomacy had been undone with one public statement from New York."¹ The secretary general's envoy was obliged to tender his resignation.

THE UN AND THE PHANTOM FAMINE

Sahnoun's tenure as special envoy had not been without result. He had paved the way for the deployment of UN troops by securing the agreement in principle of most major actors on the Somali scene, and his efforts to spur humanitarian action had begun to bear fruit. An international airlift of food, Operation Provide Relief, got under way in early September 1992 and by October several UN agencies, notably UNICEF and the World Food Program, had begun to augment their operations in the capital. By the time Sahnoun left there were signs that the famine was beginning to abate. A report by African Rights, an independent London-based human rights group, cited statistics from CARE and the United States Centers for Disease Control showing that deaths in Baidoa—the infamous "City of Death" at the epicenter of the famine—had fallen from a high of more than 1,700 a week in September to roughly 300 a week in mid-November; market prices for cereal grains in south Mogadishu, a prime indicator of food availability, had dropped in November to between one-quarter and one-third their July levels.² Whether crude mortality rates declined due to the broadening stream of international assistance or, as some observers submit, because the famine had simply passed its natural peak, there was good reason by November 1992 to believe the worst was over.

In the outside world, however, the famine was just beginning to gather momentum, stoked by the arrival in Somalia of the international press corps during August and September, nearly six months after famine's appearance among the Somali people. Shocking images of starving children and adults, accompanied by terrifying soundbites, many of them misleading—4 million people threatened by starvation; a devastating drought; 70 percent to 80 percent of food aid pillaged or diverted by predatory gangs; and war, or rather, anarchy, driven by lack of food rather than any real political motivation—formed the basis for public opinion and policymaking in the West. This distorted, superficial, and media-driven perception of Somalia would eventually trigger a massive international intervention that would contribute little to solving Somalia's long-term problems.

In early December, as UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and a wide range of Somalis gathered

in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to address the Somali crisis, the United States announced it would, at the UN's request, send 28,000 troops to Somalia to safeguard humanitarian operations. United States military planners, having studied various options, had opined that an intervention to halt the famine was "do-able." This conclusion rested on factors such as the United States military's assessment of the supposedly disorganized Somali militias—which, the military said, might put up token resistance like mining and sniping but would then withdraw. Somalia's level, open terrain, it said, offered none of the advantages to guerrillas of a Bosnia or a Vietnam. American troops could save Somalia over Christmas and be home, President George Bush forecast, before the end of January.

Boutros-Ghali and the UN Security Council accepted Washington's offer, and on December 9, 1992, the first American troops waded ashore on a Mogadishu beach into a throng of reporters. Their task, defined one week earlier by Security Council Resolution 794, was to establish "a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance"—or in the more majestic language of the Pentagon, to "Restore Hope." Though the operation was widely welcomed at the time, and later praised for its effectiveness, there is much to suggest that it did not in fact achieve its objectives.

From Day 1 of the intervention, observers from the UN and other organizations complained that the arrival of the troops actually led to a perceptible deterioration in security conditions for aid agencies on the ground. In the mission's first three months, more aid agency staff—both foreign and Somali—were killed than in the previous two years. Armed attacks, robberies, and carjackings directed against humanitarian organizations soared, and their workers complained of a greater sense of exposure to danger than ever before. At the March 1993 UN Conference on Relief and Rehabilitation in Somalia, aid organizations unanimously agreed that insecurity remained the most serious obstacle to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The "secure environment" for assistance had not been created.

In certain respects the UN mission changed things for the better. The power of the profiteering and extortion rackets that had grown up around the aid agencies was temporarily broken, and convoys traveled in relative security, bringing food to even the most remote outposts. Smaller towns like Beled Weyne and Baidoa settled into relative normality, though they were exceptions to the rule; rural areas, where many gunmen fled to avoid being disarmed, became more dangerous than ever. Larger towns remained unmanageable, and clashes and looting continued in Mogadishu despite the presence of international troops. In March 1993 militia loyal to General Morgan infiltrated the southern city of Kismayu, wresting it from the control of Aidid's SPM ally, Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, whose forces had recently been disarmed by the UN. The large

¹Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia," *Foreign Policy*, no. 91 (Summer 1993), p. 148.

²African Rights, "Somalia: Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment," May 1993, p. 9.

American and Belgian garrison in the town stood by, apparently powerless to react (though Aidid would accuse them of complicity in the attack). In north-central Somalia near Galcaio, just beyond the UN's designated area of operations, militia loyal to Aidid launched a series of attacks against the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF, the military and political wing of the northeastern Mijerteen clan), triggering the most serious fighting in the area since 1991. The UN mission's success stories, though not to be diminished—the operation probably did save tens of thousands of lives—took place in a context of persistent violence and insecurity.

THE UN AT WAR

The question of what constituted a "secure environment" and how to achieve it had been a point of dispute between the UN and the United States since the day the operation was launched. When in May 1993 the first UN mission officially passed the torch to a new, muscular UN operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II, it passed on responsibility for the most sensitive and dangerous issue: disarmament. The first mission had made some headway in this regard, through the confiscation and cantonment of heavy weapons, but most factions still possessed formidable arsenals. Lacking confidence in the UN's ability to keep the peace, and well aware of the transient, cosmetic nature of the "reconciliation process," factions preferred to retain their own means of self-defense.

UNOSOM II was at first barely distinguishable from its predecessor—part of a "seamless web" of transition envisioned by the United Nations and the United States. Though command nominally shifted from an American to a UN officer, the composition of military contingents remained the same, and the new special representative of the secretary general, retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, was American. Several elite American units remained the backbone of UNOSOM's aggressive military capacity, though not formally operating within its command structure. The operation had such an American flavor that Sahnoun's old villa in Mogadishu was dubbed "the White House" in honor of its revolving crowd of American political and military advisers.

This was far from a coincidence, as the Somalia intervention met several foreign policy objectives common to both the UN and to Bill Clinton's new administration. Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, the defining document of his tenure as secretary general, outlined a new, activist role for the UN, while the Clinton administration's vague concept of "assertive multilateralism" envisioned just such a new world order in which America would pursue its global interests through the emboldened world body. Somalia offered a promising testing ground for the new partnership. UNOSOM II thus was expected to serve two masters—one charged with upholding the highest

standards of international conduct, the other pursuing narrowly defined national self-interest.

The new partnership found expression in UNOSOM II's unprecedented mandate, contained in Security Council Resolution 814: the multinational force would be authorized to effect the "consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia." This formulation raised an obvious question. So far foreign troops in Somalia had operated only in the southern portion of the country. But to fulfill its mandate, UNOSOM II would have to stretch its resources throughout the remainder of Somalia. This posed little difficulty in the northeast, where the SSDF had been calling for the deployment of international forces since 1991. In Somaliland, however, the local administration and popular opinion were dead set against any foreign troops in their territory. Among other reasons for this, Somalilanders believed Boutros-Ghali to have been a supporter of Siad Barre during the secretary general's tenure as Egypt's foreign minister, and to have been opposed to independence for Somaliland; that UNOSOM II included a sizable contingent of Egyptian troops only confirmed their suspicions. The question eventually became academic, since UNOSOM II failed to establish more than a token presence in either the northwest or the northeast, and in neither case were troops deployed—something for which the residents of both areas would later be grateful.

Meanwhile UNOSOM's efforts to assert its authority in the south were not going smoothly, especially in the thorny domain of disarmament. Some testing of the new multinational force had been anticipated, but not anything remotely resembling the resistance actually encountered. Aidid, having sent much of his military hardware north of the UNOSOM-controlled zone where it would be safe from confiscation or cantonment, was nevertheless proving especially truculent (despite having put much of his weaponry outside UNOSOM's reach, Aidid proved the least cooperative of the faction leaders when it came to disarmament within Mogadishu itself). On June 4, exactly one month after the transition from the first UN mission, UNOSOM issued a warning to Aidid that, in accordance with agreements reached by the Somali factions at Addis Ababa in March, his weapons sites in Mogadishu would be inspected, including a particularly sensitive site at Radio Mogadishu. The next day, as Pakistani troops arrived to carry out the search, gunmen opened fire in an apparently concerted ambush. Pakistani troops at a nearby feeding center were attacked at the same time, and their bodies mutilated by a crowd. In all, 24 Pakistani UN soldiers died.

The Security Council's reaction was sharp—and unexpected. In a new resolution it authorized UNOSOM to take "all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks." Admiral Howe declared Aidid would be held responsible for the

killings and put out a warrant for his arrest. The general's involvement in the massacre would never be proved, but Somalis noted that Aidid had been singled out for special treatment; a similarly treacherous and nearly simultaneous attack on UN peacekeepers in Cambodia drew hardly a whisper of protest. Practically overnight, UNOSOM's "peace enforcement" mission was transformed into a crusade against Aidid. Having identified his quarry, Howe denounced Aidid as a "cancer" and "a caged scorpion," and placed a \$25,000 bounty on his head. Aidid responded with a \$1 million reward for Howe's capture, which drove the admiral, much like the fugitive general, to spend his nights in a secure bunker.

UNOSOM's ensuing undeclared war with Aidid catalyzed an exponential escalation of violence in Mogadishu. Barely a week after the killing of the Pakistanis, UN troops, according to journalists who witnessed the incident, opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators at a major intersection in south Mogadishu, killing several people. UNOSOM's version—that gunmen were concealed in the crowd—was never confirmed by other eyewitnesses. Throughout the rest of the summer gunships thundered over Mogadishu. The city's Hodan area—Aidid's stronghold—was bombarded, and dozens of houses were seriously damaged. A Cobra gunship fired on the headquarters of French aid organizations Doctors without Borders and International Action against Hunger with rockets and machine guns, killing one Somali staff member; the gunner had mistaken a television crew's boom microphone for a weapon. An official complaint from Doctors without Borders to the UN in New York was never acted on. On July 12 several gunships attacked the house of Aidid ally Abdi Qaybdiid, which UNOSOM alleged harbored a "key terrorist cell." In fact, a large SNA meeting was in progress, with several of Aidid's opponents and community leaders in attendance. The Red Cross identified no fewer than 54 bodies among the rubble.

UNOSOM was unrepentant, despite the outcry from the press and international organizations. UNOSOM's own justice section, alarmed by the operation's routine use of excessive force in the wake of the July 12 massacre, leaked a deeply critical report regarding the "important legal and human rights issues" raised by the actions. However, spokesmen for the operation unashamedly went on record day after day extolling the mission's virtues and successes.

On October 3, during a "weapons sweep" near the capital's Olympic Hotel, 18 American soldiers were killed and more than 70 wounded in a firefight with well-organized SNA forces. Red Cross estimates put the Somali death toll—predominantly civilian—at more than 200, with many more injured. Not even UNOSOM's hardened spin doctors could control the damage. The operation dropped its manhunt for Aidid and adopted a "nonconfrontational" posture.

SANDBAGS AND SIGNATURES

Under strict new orders, the peacekeepers spent most of their time hunkered down behind sandbags and barbed wire, enjoined not to become involved in any "interclan fighting." Although blue helmets no longer went looking for trouble, attacks against UN troops and international agencies did not diminish. Indeed, at one point the entire Zimbabwean UN contingent at Beled Weyne was taken prisoner by forces loyal to Aidid and relieved of its weapons and equipment—an unequaled humiliation of UN forces. (The secretary general barely mentioned the incident in his next report to the Security Council.) UNOSOM also fell prey to the kinds of threats and extortion used to justify its deployment in the first place, paying exorbitant rates for houses, staff, and vehicles it may no longer use or require. Nongovernmental organizations and UN agencies have long since gone back to employing their own armed guards, or have left the country. In many towns in the south there is no longer any international presence.

UNOSOM's political track record has been as disappointing as its military one. Since Sahnoun's departure, the UN has pushed for national reconciliation and the formation of a government at virtually any cost, to no avail. As Ken Mankhaus, a former UNOSOM political officer and noted Somali watcher, remarked after a trip to Somalia last October, "UNOSOM has always needed speedy and successful reconciliation and formation of a national government in Somalia more than have the Somali faction leaders." The operation's breakneck peace initiatives have produced agreements that observers see as artificial at best and purchased at worst. Though reliable figures are hard to come by, it appears that UNOSOM's "financial support" to peace conferences has been instrumental in eliciting signatures, though not results. The Lower Juba conference, for example, which was intended to bring peace to the Kismayu area (despite the absence of one of the major parties to the conflict), reportedly carried a price tag of between \$500,000 and \$600,000. The imam of Hiraaab, a Hawiye clan elder, is reported by Somali aides to have received more than \$250,000 for a series of conferences intended to produce a "pan-Hawiye" peace; the Hawiye factions in Mogadishu are now more fragmented than ever.

It is not simply the abuse of UNOSOM's financial resources that is troubling here; agreements that have to be bought are unlikely to last longer than it takes recipients to spend the money. UNOSOM's eagerness to show "results" before its departure has led its leaders into expedient and ethically questionable practices that will contribute little to the welfare of the Somali people. This is a long way from the kind of slow, gritty peacemaking that won Sahnoun his reputation, and it is unlikely to generate the successes the UN operation so badly wants.

UNOSOM's reports to the press and to the Security Council, however, have implied just the opposite. The Somali Task Force, a United States-based independent group of academics and observers of the Somali scene, described one such report as containing "willful misreadings and misrepresentations, designed to portray the situation in a much more positive light than the situation warrants." One dripping eulogy of UNOSOM's achievements penned by a spokesman appeared in the Kenyan press under the specious headline, "From Killing Fields to Land of Hope." The operation's inelegant attempts to gloss over its faults do nothing for its credibility—or that of the United Nations.

Somalis have in general been better off when UNOSOM left them alone. Over the past two years there have been only two relatively successful peace initiatives—neither with UNOSOM support. The Mudug peace agreement, reached in May 1993 by Aidid and Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf of the SSDF, brought peace for the first time in years to the communities around Galcaio in the central region; a parallel conference sponsored by UNOSOM ended in failure. In Somaliland the April 1993 Borama peace accords settled a six-month conflict in the northwest and ushered in a year and a half of tranquillity under the administration of Mohammed Haji Ibrahim Egal; UNOSOM, whose official vocabulary does not even contain the word "Somaliland," had virtually nothing to do with the pact. Not coincidentally, perhaps, these two regions, which have enjoyed a degree of stability rare for Somalia, are also where UNOSOM's presence is weakest.

FIGHTING OVER A CORPSE

UNOSOM's political strategy is likely to create more turbulence and violence for Somalia, if not until after the last troops depart. The operation's focus on forming a government has already created profound stresses in most Somali factions that could easily translate into armed conflict. Splinter groups in each clan have turned increasingly to the UN as an alternative path to legitimacy. Unable to win a mandate from their constituents, these opportunists may earn themselves seats at the conference table—and perhaps a post in some future government—by bending UNOSOM's ear.

The current UN special envoy, Victor Gbeho, has called for the withdrawal of all UN staff from Somalia on UNOSOM's departure, predicting a grave deterioration in security conditions throughout the country. Though few UN agencies are likely to go to such extremes, Gbeho's pessimism may not prove entirely unjustified. The pressure to form a government and to reclaim the mantle of Somali sovereignty could easily bring the

major factions into open conflict and trigger a new round of the civil war. Virtually every clan now finds its political fortunes linked to the conflict in Mogadishu (which was not the case when war broke out in 1991). This means the danger that a battle between the Mogadishu-based factions could lead to fighting elsewhere is more real now than at any time in Somalia's recent past. In such a scenario, the definitive victory of one side or the other would seem unlikely. No faction enjoys the power base necessary to impose its will on others. The fiat of a coalition government will not extend beyond the territory of the members of the coalition—and no coalition can realistically claim to control even half the country. Even if one side did, experience shows that in Somalia "victory" does not mean "government."

What the faction leaders do not seem to recognize is that the prize they are fighting over—the aid-bloated corpse of the last Somali state—is no prize at all. The arms and aid dollars on which the old Somali republic thrived are no longer on offer from either East or West. Nor is it the wish of the majority of the Somali people to see that kind of regime return. Regardless of their home region or clan affiliation, Somalis are united in jealously guarding their hard-won freedom—whether from a Siad Barre, an Aidid, or any other would-be dictator. The next government will inherit a ruined economy, a war-ravaged infrastructure, and a people intolerant of the unrepresentative, corrupt, and overweening authority that characterized the old Somalia. The civil war has brought little if anything for Somalis to celebrate, but it does hold out the promise of change. To establish a centralized and autocratic administration now is to resurrect the kind of regime Somalis thought they had buried in 1991.

Sadly, much of the UN's time and energy over the past two years has been dedicated to doing just that. With UNOSOM out of the picture, there may be room for new, less ambitious moves in the direction of peace. It will be up to Somalis to devise a new formula for statehood and governance—one that will not permit the kind of abuses Siad Barre perpetrated and so many of today's faction leaders seem to aspire to. The international community, however, has a role to play in helping Somalis back to their feet. So far that role has been tragically and wastefully mismanaged; for all its noble objectives, the United Nations Operation in Somalia has been a failure and cause for international shame. Unless its faults and offenses are acknowledged, the United Nations will have done a disservice not only to the Somali people but to the very laws and principles it purports to uphold. ■

"Although the United Nations military presence was crucial to the implementation of the peace agreement, the political agreements between the parties to the conflict were a necessary condition; in other words, the political will to pursue peace, and to allow UN forces to help, was there. Had it not been, peacekeepers could have found themselves uninvited and unwanted guests in the middle of a deadly domestic dispute."

Mozambique: The Terror of War, the Tensions of Peace

BY ROBERT B. LLOYD

Mozambicans cast ballots in their country's first-ever multiparty elections last October 27 through 29. There were long lines under a hot sun at polling stations, but patience is a virtue learned over a decade and a half of war. The elections meant different things to different parties. For the average Mozambican they represented peace and security, the chance to return home, plant crops, and rebuild lives. On the national level the vote was designed to resolve a conflict between the government and an armed opposition group that had bogged down in a bloody and destructive stalemate; it would establish the political legitimacy of the winning party and its right to govern the country.

The stakes were likewise great for the international community. The United Nations, which had monitored the implementation of the peace agreement and was supervising the elections, set great store by the success of its operation in Mozambique. Two other UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, in Somalia and Angola, had been widely criticized as failures. In 1992 Angola had plunged into renewed fighting on an appalling scale immediately after the first round of UN-monitored elections, and the UN was blamed for overseeing the Angolan elections on the cheap. Thus in Mozambique the UN operated under a clear mandate, kept in close contact with all parties to the conflict, and tried to ensure adequate funding for all phases of the peacekeeping process. Its mission culminated in the October elections, when for a brief moment the media spotlight shone on a country that for many is remote and obscure.

A TANGLED WAR

The Republic of Mozambique, located on the southeastern coast of Africa, is mostly tropical savannah lowland, and subject to periodic drought. Slightly less than twice the size of California, its population of 16 million is roughly half that of the state. Some 25 ethnic groups live in Mozambique, of which the Makua-Lomwe sociolinguistic group is the largest, accounting for about half the people. Portuguese, the official language, is spoken by only a relatively small percentage. The majority of Mozambicans follow traditional religious beliefs, but Islam predominates along the northeastern coast and Christianity is widespread in the south. Life expectancy at birth is less than 50 years, and less than a third of the population is literate.

For 1992 the World Bank listed Mozambique as the world's poorest country, with a per capita income of \$60. Although only 5 percent of the arable land is under cultivation, agriculture accounts for approximately two-thirds of GDP. In 1990–1991, official development assistance constituted an extraordinary 98 percent of GNP.

The country shares borders with six southern African countries—South Africa, Tanzania, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia—and is the natural outlet to the sea for all but South Africa and Tanzania. For South Africa, Mozambique's capital, Maputo, is the closest ocean port to the industrial heartland around Johannesburg. These geopolitical factors help explain Mozambique's strategic importance to many of the nations of the region.

In particular, South Africa's interest in Mozambique began with the discovery of gold in the Transvaal of South Africa in the nineteenth century. The resulting economic boom in the Transvaal led to a series of moves and countermoves on the part of the British and Dutch-descended (Afrikaaner) settlers to control the region and its resources. To secure a link to the ocean outside of British control, the Afrikaaners built a

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railroad from Johannesburg to the port of Lourenço Marques (Maputo) in Mozambique. This firmly tied the southern part of Mozambique into the economy of South Africa.

If colonial history is the soil which nourished Mozambique, then the roots of Mozambique's conflict extend to the wave of decolonization that swept Africa in the 1960s. Of critical importance to Mozambican independence efforts was the independence of the former British colonies of Tanzania in 1961 and Zambia in 1964. These two formed the nucleus of what became known as the Front-Line States, a group of newly independent southern African countries dedicated to ending colonial rule in the region and eliminating apartheid in South Africa.

In 1962 several small political groups opposed to Portuguese rule in Mozambique merged under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane to form the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Tanzania, and later Zambia, provided sanctuary for the front's guerrilla attacks on northern Mozambique. The Portuguese military, mired in battles against liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, staged a successful coup back in Lisbon. The new government capitulated to FRELIMO and turned the government of Mozambique over to the front in 1974 without either a referendum or elections. Full independence was granted in 1975, with FRELIMO leader Samora Machel as president and FRELIMO as the only legal party.

The events of the next two years proved crucial for Mozambique's political and economic future, though it was not clear at the time that they laid the foundation for the civil war that would later decimate the country. In 1976 the new government, in support of UN sanctions, closed the border with white-ruled Rhodesia, cutting off Rhodesia's sea access through the port of Beira. At the same time Mozambique allowed Rhodesian Patriotic Front guerrillas to stage attacks across the border in Rhodesia. Rhodesia countered in 1977 by forming the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), a Rhodesian-directed group of Mozambicans disenchanted with the FRELIMO government. RENAMO launched a series of strikes into Mozambique to disrupt Rhodesian guerrilla forces. That year Mozambique also held its first elections, in which FRELIMO proclaimed its commitment to Marxist-Leninist principles. Finally, the economy, reeling from an exodus of skilled Portuguese settlers, the cost of the war with Rhodesia, and the implementation of unsound economic policies, began a freefall that led to its collapse in the early 1980s.

In 1980 Rhodesia became independent Zimbabwe, and the South African government became RENAMO's patron. Now based in South Africa, RENAMO grew much more militarily effective, and by 1982 civil war had spread throughout much of Mozambique. Zimbabwe,

concerned that its lifeline to Beira might be cut, sent troops to patrol the road, railway, and oil pipelines of the Beira Corridor. The damage wrought by the civil war was compounded by a drought that afflicted central Mozambique. Faced with severe political and economic hardships, Mozambique signed the Nkomati nonaggression accord with South Africa in 1984. Although Mozambique adhered to the accord by not allowing the African National Congress to use Mozambique as a base in its struggle against the South African government, Pretoria continued to support RENAMO. In 1984 Mozambique also began to move closer to the West, joining the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Over the next six years Mozambique embraced a structural adjustment program developed by the two institutions, abandoned Marxism-Leninism, and adopted a new constitution transforming the country into a multiparty state where regular elections would be held and human rights guaranteed.

To a large extent FRELIMO's political and economic reforms met many if not most of RENAMO's demands. Civil war, however, continued, and a stalemate deepened in which the guerrillas lacked the means or will to take the provincial capitals and Maputo and the government was unable to defeat them in the countryside.

INVITING THE WORLD IN

In 1990 the first direct talks between RENAMO and FRELIMO began. An agreed-on cease-fire soon broke down, but the peace process began in earnest in 1992, when Mozambique, with the rest of southern Africa, suffered the worst drought in more than a century. This effectively moved the conflict from a stalemate to a "hurting stalemate." The warring parties agreed, in an August 1992 declaration, "on guiding principles for humanitarian assistance" to aid both sides.

On October 4, President Joaquim Chissano and RENAMO head Afonso Dhlakama, meeting in Rome, signed the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, formally ending 16 years of armed conflict and putting a cease-fire into effect. Implementation of the pact was to be verified by the UN. The UN Security Council quickly adopted the resolution that established the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) and provided for the deployment of 7,500 troops, police, and civilian observers to oversee the demobilization process; the formation of a new armed forces composed of elements of RENAMO and FRELIMO; and the supervision of upcoming national elections. Aldo Ajello, the UN secretary general's special representative for Mozambique, arrived in the country to oversee UN operations. A donor's conference in Rome pledged \$398 million for humanitarian and electoral assistance.

Under the agreement's provisions, a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) was established to oversee the overall implementation of the peace ac-

cord. Seven other commissions were established, each covering a specific aspect of the agreement. These commissions played a crucial role in the peace process, providing the machinery to reach consensus and to settle disputes through discussion and negotiation. UNOMOZ chaired the CSC and three other committees concerned primarily with military matters.

By mid-1993 UNOMOZ forces were approaching full strength, with approximately 4,700 armed and more than 150 unarmed personnel contributed by 19 countries deployed throughout the country. The objectives of the UN peacekeepers were to verify and monitor the cease-fire and the separation, cantonment, and demobilization of RENAMO and FRELIMO forces; the collection, storage, and destruction of their weapons; the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces; and the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups. Peacekeeping troops also provided security for vital infrastructure and for UN and other international agencies working in support of the peace process. (One notes that this UN mandate was broader than the one in Angola).

Although the United Nations military presence was crucial to the implementation of the peace agreement, the political agreements between the parties to the conflict were a necessary condition; in other words, the political will to pursue peace and to allow UN forces to help was there. Had it not been, peacekeepers could have found themselves uninvited and unwanted guests in the middle of a deadly domestic dispute. As it was, Mozambicans on both sides of the conflict respected and cooperated with the UNOMOZ forces.

UN intervention had its costs for the two sides. FRELIMO had to yield substantial national sovereignty. A well-equipped foreign military force had freedom of movement throughout the country. An arm of the UN—the World Bank—kept the country afloat financially. Half the troops in Mozambique's future army would be RENAMO soldiers. All this was bitter medicine for those who had fought a 10-year war of independence against the Portuguese and had supported the fight against white rule in Rhodesia and South Africa.

RENAMO faced many uncertainties as well. The rural areas of the country had provided a relatively safe environment for the rebels, but once outside their strongholds the threat of reprisal was real. RENAMO's transformation into a political party from a decentralized armed movement staffed by conscripted young men and boys and financed through banditry and South African funds was not easy. Finally, the group's future role in governing Mozambique was as yet unclear.

These factors were undoubtedly behind RENAMO's subsequent objections to the peace process. These concerns, UN difficulties in obtaining troops and funds for UNOMOZ, and delays in troop demobilization soon put the peace process a year behind schedule.

DEMobilizing FOR THE VOTE

In April 1994 President Chissano officially set the election date for that October. Demobilization, however, was still incomplete and the new army not yet fully operational; RENAMO and FRELIMO both retained troops. This greatly concerned the UN, having faced in Angola in 1992 a situation where government and rebel troops had not been fully demobilized and melded into a joint army when election day arrived. The withdrawal of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) from the peace process after defeat in the first round of voting had left UNITA with an intact army, with which it restarted the war in October 1992. Thus the peace pact in Mozambique aimed at—and succeeded in—demobilizing the armed forces of each side and forming a new joint army before elections, making it more difficult for the losing side to take up arms.

The peace agreement in Mozambique also provided for international observation of the electoral process. The international observers would help guarantee the integrity of the elections by verifying, monitoring, and evaluating electoral registration and all other acts related to the election process. Approximately 2,500 international election monitors were recruited from some 28 countries to observe at more than 6,000 polling stations. In a sense they were an expensive form of insurance taken out against the contingency of catastrophic loss. In the event of disaster—a total breakdown in confidence between RENAMO and FRELIMO—the observers could give a verdict on the fairness of the voter registration, the campaign, and the actual vote. This role was to prove especially important.

The logistics of holding an election in Mozambique were daunting. Some polling stations were set up in isolated RENAMO-controlled areas accessible only by helicopter; election observers flew in with radios, military rations, bottled water, and camping supplies.

The big day began in confusion. RENAMO, citing voting irregularities, pulled out of the elections, alleging, for example, that pro-FRELIMO Zimbabweans had crossed the border to vote. Many voters in rural areas did not hear of the party's election boycott; however, balloting proceeded, even in RENAMO zones that heard the news. At one polling station that went overwhelmingly for RENAMO, the village chief (also a RENAMO supporter) expressed amazement at Dhlakama's decision and decided to proceed with the vote because the UN and the National Election Commission supported the elections. This seemed to be the general attitude, and combined with intense international pressure and assurances that all concerns would be thoroughly investigated, it persuaded RENAMO within a day to renounce its boycott. The elections were extended one day to ensure that every registered voter had the opportunity to vote.

If voter participation is one of the measures of the

success of the democratic process, the Mozambican elections were a triumph. Nearly 88 percent of the 6.1 million registered voters cast ballots. Among the 12 candidates running for president, incumbent President Chissano and his ruling FRELIMO Party won the election with more than 53 percent of the vote, easily besting RENAMO leader Dhlakama, who finished second with 34 percent.

Fourteen parties contested the races for the new 250-member National Assembly. FRELIMO won a narrow majority (129 seats), while RENAMO did much better than in the presidential contest, capturing 112 seats. A third party, the União Democrática, received just over 5 percent of the vote, for 9 seats. This unexpected strength may have been due to its position on the ballot. On the presidential ballot, President Chissano was listed last. However, the legislative ballot listed the União Democrática last. Voters may have marked the bottom of each ballot, mistakenly believing they were voting for FRELIMO.

This União Democrática example illustrates the difficulty of understanding the will of the electorate. Many voters were illiterate, and the act of voting sometimes proved an overwhelming task, especially for older citizens. Nearly 12 percent of the ballots cast turned out to be blank or improperly marked, and were disqualified. In rural areas people often appeared to vote for either FRELIMO or RENAMO depending on whose control the village had been under before the elections.

Although FRELIMO clearly emerged victorious, RENAMO fared well. Each party won 5 of the country's 10 provinces. FRELIMO won in the northern and southern provinces; it had begun the war for independence in the north, while the south is where the capital is located and much of the leadership is concentrated. RENAMO gained a majority in the central provinces, but FRELIMO won by a wider margin in the north and south—hence its higher overall percentage. Significantly, RENAMO carried the two most populous provinces of Nampula and Zambezia, where members of the majority ethnic group, the Makua-Lomwe, are concentrated. This shows that support for the former rebels went beyond the Ndau, who live primarily in Manica and Sofala provinces, and from whose ranks RENAMO had drawn much of its backing and most of its leaders.

Was the UN peacekeeping operation in Mozambique a success? Human frailties and administrative foul-ups inevitably leave their mark on an operation of such size and complexity, and friction between individuals and parties inevitably accompanies a process of conflict resolution. Nevertheless, if the goal was the end of the civil war, the demobilization of troops, and the establishment of a legitimate, popularly elected government, it must be judged successful. The UN operated under a clear mandate, enjoyed the confidence of the Mozambican people and government, possessed sufficient

financial and personnel resources, and had the support of the international community.

As for the future, the economy is in shambles. The infrastructure is largely destroyed. Schools, health clinics, and roads must be rebuilt. Increasing economic growth will be a major objective of any government. One obvious method will be reestablishment of the ports and road links to neighboring landlocked countries such as Malawi, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Increases in farm production and self-sufficiency will require capital inputs. Mozambique will remain dependent on large inflows of foreign assistance for its reconstruction and development.

Mozambique's democracy is fragile. The rules and traditions under which differences are settled peacefully take time to develop, and the first few years will be critical. A FRELIMO that believes it "won" by the ballot what it could not win by arms, and ignores RENAMO in governing the country, would set a bad precedent. Alternately, RENAMO could play the opposition role, but not in a loyal and constructive manner.

Banditry is a problem, and the government lacks the ability to patrol transport routes adequately. A lack of security and stability would seriously undermine Mozambique's ability to recover. The recent political changes in South Africa, though, mean that it is far less likely to foment strife in Mozambique.

Nor must the psychological effect of the war be underestimated in predicting the country's future. The civil war was a traumatic experience for Mozambicans. They lost homes and loved ones, and the war pitted cousin against cousin. According to estimates by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in January 1993 there were 1.7 million Mozambican refugees in surrounding countries; many more were displaced within Mozambique. Estimates of the number who died in the war vary enormously, but numbers in excess of 1 million are cited. The civil war will be a reference point in the life of the country for many generations to come. On the positive side, war-weariness makes a return to resolving differences through fighting an unappetizing option.

Finally, although the Mozambican elections were a success, they were possible only because of international assistance. The logistical, voter training, and administrative demands of the elections were substantial; the UN Development Program puts the final cost of the elections at \$63.5 million. But the election aid was only one element of the international aid to Mozambique that enabled the vote. To oversimplify, the World Bank provided financial security and the UN provided military protection; with this "safety net" voting was able to take place. If a large degree of trust develops between the political parties it would be possible to hold elections that were not so costly—but at the risk of fewer safeguards protecting the integrity of the process. ■

If the genocide in Rwanda "had been committed on any other continent, there can be little doubt that moves would have been initiated by at least some major Western countries to invoke sanctions. . . The characterization of the crisis as 'uncontrollable tribal anarchy' . . . succeeded in deluding the world for a crucial few weeks that the genocide was not the systematic, centrally planned extermination of political opponents and all members of one ethnic group, but a spontaneous outbreak of tribal bloodletting."

The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response

BY ALEX DE WAAL AND RAKIYA OMAAR

The genocide unleashed by Rwanda's Hutu extremist government on April 6, 1994, was the bloodiest 100 days of the second half of the twentieth century.* At least 750,000 people were slaughtered. The aim, which was nearly achieved, was the total annihilation of the Rwandese Tutsi. Any members of the majority Hutu who stood in the way were also killed. The sophistication of the genocide's organization cannot be obscured by the low technology with which it was carried out—machetes, clubs, and fragmentation grenades rather than gas chambers.

An ideology of Hutu extremism drove the killers; it is the bastardized product of nineteenth-century European racial theories, specifically the now discredited "Hamitic hypothesis," which posited a racial difference between the three ethnicities found in Rwanda and neighboring Burundi. The Tutsi (about 15 percent of the population) were "black Caucasian" conquerors from Ethiopia, a superior, aristocratic race; the majority Hutu were designated Bantu peasants, incapable of playing a role in a civilized society; and the tiny minority of Twa hunter-gatherers were relegated to the status of aboriginal Pygmies, leftovers from an earlier stage of human evolution.

Hutu extremism was no fringe ideology: until last year extremists controlled the Rwandan government, army, and ruling party. Hutu supremacists had ruled Rwanda since the eve of independence in 1959, when

the first in a series of jaqueries overthrew the Tutsi oligarchy that ruled the country. Successive Hutu presidents, Grégoire Kayibanda (1959–1973) and Juvénal Habyarimana (1973–1994), elevated the Hutus to the pinnacle of the ethnic hierarchy. Habyarimana's grip on power was threatened, however, in 1990 by three simultaneous developments: economic decline that precipitated a dose of severe shock therapy by the International Monetary Fund; the opening of the political system to allow moderate, Hutu-led opposition parties; and the invasion from Uganda of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), an organization founded and led by Tutsi exiles.

Habyarimana responded with repression. There were several massacres in which an estimated 8,000 Tutsis were killed, and political assassinations of Tutsi and opposition Hutu leaders became commonplace. An international investigation concluded that responsibility for these abuses could be traced to the president's office. A party militia, the interahamwe, was formed; private publications and Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines disseminated Hutu propaganda that incited racial hatred.

In August 1993 President Habyarimana, under pressure from domestic opposition, the RPF, Western donors, and neighboring countries, agreed to a comprehensive peace agreement with the RPF and civilian opposition parties, and a transition to democracy. The agreements, signed in Arusha, Tanzania, provided for power sharing in all government institutions and the army, guarantees on human rights, and the dispatch of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), a force of 2,500 UN troops to oversee the peace process. At the urging of his own coterie of extremists, Habyarimana tried to delay the peace process, which, had it succeeded, would have consigned the Hutu extremists to political oblivion. But international pressure continued: on April 4, 1994, the UN Security Council voted to

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keep the UN mission in Rwanda and the next day a meeting of regional heads of state in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, extracted a pledge from the Rwandese president that he would begin to hand over power. As Habyarimana returned to Kigali, extremists in the Presidential Guard shot down his airplane and set in motion their final solution.

Within 48 hours, France and Belgium found enough troops to organize the evacuation of foreigners from Rwanda. But after 10 Belgian UN soldiers were murdered trying to protect the moderate Hutu prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana (who was also killed), Belgium and the United States pushed the UN Security Council for a withdrawal of UNAMIR. The force was reduced to 450 men, and thousands of Rwandese who had sought protection at UN military bases were abandoned to their fate. This abandonment rapidly became an international scandal, and on April 29 the Security Council reconsidered its decision and authorized a new peacekeeping force of 5,500 troops. Because of delays in obtaining the troops and deciding on the precise mandate and funding—delays largely instigated by a new United States policy that emphasized extreme caution on peacekeeping initiatives—the UN troops were not ready until July. By then the interim government had been defeated by the RPF, which had resumed its offensive the day after the massacres began.

There has been substantial international criticism of the UN's role in Rwanda. But this masks equally profound shortcomings in the response of the international humanitarian agencies. The relief community has done some things right in Rwanda, and has learned some lessons. But it has also made grievous mistakes. What is most depressing about the performance over Rwanda is the extremely slow capacity to learn from past errors. International relief agencies—especially nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—are surrounded by such an aura of sanctity, and are the subject of such intense propaganda, both by themselves and more persuasively by the international media, that public criticism of their activities is almost completely taboo. This is a shame, because it is public accountability that is the chief stimulus to change in any service-providing organization, and because the staffs of relief agencies end up believing the propaganda themselves, with adverse consequences for the supposed beneficiaries. The dangers of uncritical NGO-style humanitarianism may not be immediately evident, but for the people of Africa they are very real.

Many who have worked on relief operations privately admit that they did little good and considerable harm. But, like a missionary professing atheism, this realization almost always remains secret. It should be kept secret no longer. The emperor, if not entirely naked, has very few clothes. There are major dilemmas that need to be addressed if relief operations in

political emergencies are to become part of the solution and not to continue to be part of the problem.

Throughout the world, relief aid delivered by international agencies has become integrated into processes of violence and oppression. This is not something new. It happened in Biafra, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. Now, however, it is becoming a near-universal feature of international humanitarian operations. In Bosnia and Sudan the relief operations are so deeply entrenched that major reform appears to be almost impossible. In Angola similar processes have rapidly become institutionalized. Fleeting, it appeared as though relief operations in Rwanda and with Rwandese refugees might avoid becoming part of the same pattern. It now appears that such optimism was premature, and a familiar synergy between relief and violence has rapidly emerged.

THE CHALLENGE OF GENOCIDE

The scale and nature of the abuses in Rwanda have been exceptional. The former government was solely dedicated to genocide. Following the elimination of officials who did not support the mass killing, it became difficult to find anyone in a position of high authority able to exercise a moderating influence.

Genocide is not the only crime in Rwanda today, but it is the most serious. This remains the case, even though the mass killing has been brought to an end. Genocide is a crime that, under international law, obliges certain responses from states and organizations with a commitment to human rights.

For an organization with human rights in its mandate, the corollaries of using the label "genocide" include denying legitimacy or impunity to those responsible for the crime. In the context of genocide, any organization that avows basic human values cannot be neutral: genocide is wrong. Following this through creates huge obstacles to mounting relief operations in the places controlled by the perpetrators. The perpetrators of genocide take the position, "If you are not with us, you are against us." This at least has the virtue of honesty. The appropriate response from a human rights organization is: "We are against you, and we will do all in our power to halt your crime and bring you to court charged with crimes against humanity."

This is an uncomfortable position for pacifists. It is also an uncomfortable position for an organization trying to implement relief programs on the ground that involve working alongside people complicit in genocide. Oxfam took the first step along the road of action against genocide, and raised expectations among Rwandese and the human rights community that it would follow through. However, Oxfam then failed to take further steps. One reason for this was that, like other international actors, Oxfam became preoccupied with lobbying the UN to dispatch troops. Throughout the genocide in Rwanda (which lasted until June), Western

governments and international NGOs were preoccupied with the dispatch of UN troops to Rwanda. This was a mistaken priority that did nothing to halt the killings, and in fact prolonged the slaughter. It was based on several false premises.

First, it assumed that UN troops could do the job demanded of them—namely, preventing the genocide and punishing those responsible. It is highly unlikely that they would have been able to do this. It was almost certainly technically impossible for UN troops to have protected all the civilians at risk. In addition, to punish those responsible for the crime would have required forsaking neutrality and being prepared to take casualties. There was never any indication that any major international player was willing to take these steps.

The sorry record of UN troops in Bosnia, Somalia, and indeed in Rwanda itself in the early days of the crisis gave no grounds for confidence that the UN could provide any solution. Those who advocated sending UN troops to keep the peace could do so only by willfully ignoring recent history.

Hence, international troops, had they been sent as envisaged in April or May, would have been largely a practical and moral irrelevance.

Second, the focus on UN troops assumed that no other alternative approaches were open for the prevention of genocide. This was not the case: two major opportunities were missed.

One was to exercise moral leadership. This would have involved public condemnation of those responsible for the genocide, by name; expulsion of Rwandese ambassadors (above all from the UN, where Rwanda's ambassador continued to sit on the Security Council throughout the crisis), and the threat of indictment for crimes against humanity. Diplomats were never receptive to these ideas. Within the NGO world, with its curious mixture of cynical defeatism and naïveté, these possibilities were never seriously considered. One NGO staff member said that "there is no point in expressing moral outrage without being able to take practical action."

Though expressed in a private capacity, this is a highly revealing statement, in that such sentiments clearly influenced NGO policy. This point of view is contrary to the basic principle of human rights work, namely that condemning violations is imperative, irrespective of whether concrete action can be taken. Moral outrage is expressed partly to express solidarity with those who are suffering abuses, and to ostracize those who are committing them. Moral condemnation is a practical action that can have practical effects.

The most important international action to stem the bloodshed in Rwanda and give courage to those resisting the killing was repeated public expressions of solidarity and moral outrage. They would have helped isolate and discourage the killers, and encourage those opposed to them. Ordinary Rwandese are more bitter

about the lack of this outrage than any other of the many failings of the international community.

Economic sanctions against Rwanda were never on the agenda. Although they would have taken too long to have any effect in the short term, the issue was never even raised. If the crime had been committed on any other continent, there can be little doubt that moves would have been initiated by at least some major Western countries to invoke sanctions. Why not in Rwanda? The triumph of humanitarianism is part of the answer; the agenda was being set by international relief organizations. The other element is the characterization of the crisis as "uncontrollable tribal anarchy." Sanctions make sense when aimed against a centralized controlling authority. Such an authority existed in Rwanda, but it succeeded in deluding the world for a crucial few weeks that the genocide was not the systematic, centrally planned extermination of political opponents and all members of one ethnic group, but a spontaneous outbreak of tribal bloodletting.

The preoccupation with an international response to the genocide in Rwanda also overlooked one crucial fact: a Rwandese solution to the disaster was at hand, in the form of the military victory of the Rwandese Patriotic Front.

THE RPF

The RPF was in a position to halt the genocide, and in due course it did so. It chose the military option, and launched an offensive that in three months inflicted a decisive military defeat on the government. It is difficult to see how it could have responded otherwise.

It is arguable that the RPF had responsibilities under the Genocide Conventions to act in the way that it did (that is, the RPF had an obligation under international law to do all in its power to halt the genocide and punish those guilty of it). Human rights law acknowledges legitimate military goals—and one of these is protecting civilian targets of genocide. Hence, in the circumstances, it would have been an abdication of its human rights responsibility for the RPF to have stopped its military advance, just as it would have been wrong for the American troops to have halted at the gates of Dachau in April 1945. The other options would have been to negotiate with the interim government with the aim of getting government forces to stop the killing; it could also have called on the UN to stop the killing. Both alternatives would have been extremely naive.

The counterargument is that the RPF advance was provoking the genocide. The killings in fact started before the RPF offensive, and were carried out in accordance with a systematic plan. Some of the regions worst affected by the genocide never experienced any fighting. While killings did briefly intensify—from an already high level—in one or two places just before they were captured by the RPF, the guerrilla advance was by far the main brake on the killing.

Western governments and NGOs did not support the RPF advance. In fact, they repeatedly called on the RPF to observe a cease-fire, without securing any guarantees from the government to halt the genocide. Part of the reason for this was so that UN troops could be dispatched to protect civilians.

Why was it preferable for UN troops to halt the genocide rather than Rwandese rebel fighters? It is questionable whether UN forces are more legitimate than the RPF. Legally, the RPF is bound by certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions. At a practical level, the chief value of UN troops is their neutrality. Yet in Rwanda the UN (and other international players) used "neutrality" to hide their lack of a political strategy and their weak commitment to implementing the provisions of the Genocide Conventions. Operational neutrality triumphed over human rights objectivity.

The RPF, however, was actively engaged in rescuing people at risk of massacre and committed to following this rescue through to the end, while the record of UN peacekeepers in carrying out their mandate is increasingly seen as poor. Knowing that the UN had no proven capacity to stop the genocide, for the West and the NGOs to advocate UN intervention was an abdication of responsibility.

THE CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE

Calling for a cease-fire is a political act that charitable organizations are not required, legally or morally, to undertake. Calling for a cease-fire is also not a human rights statement, nor is the UN required to call for a cease-fire in a conflict (in Kuwait, for example, it called for a war).

The appropriate human rights statement would have been to call for both sides to desist from abrogating the Geneva Conventions, and to call for both sides to do all in their power to halt the genocide. The latter implies, if necessary, taking military action to halt genocide.

Nonetheless, in Rwanda the UN repeatedly called for a cease-fire. Procedural habits of neutralism took precedence over the rationale on which the organization was ostensibly founded—fundamental human justice. The pathetically slow progress of the UN's investigations into human rights abuses in Rwanda echoes the same systemic weaknesses.

Some international NGOs also appealed for a cease-fire. Oxfam, for example, called for a cease-fire and political negotiations. This call appears to have been made for several reasons. These include:

- A cease-fire was a precondition for the dispatch of UN troops.
- The fighting was causing human suffering and impeding the delivery of humanitarian relief.
- Not to call for a cease-fire would have appeared to be compromising the neutrality of the organization.

It is evident that Oxfam's call was (unsurprisingly) influenced by the organization's own institutional priorities. But, by including human rights and conflict resolution in the appeal (and also in its institutional mandate), Oxfam implied that its suggested actions would tackle all of these areas; that the priorities it was outlining were the priorities for Rwanda as a whole. This was misleading: Oxfam's priority was an emergency relief response, which it duly mounted. However, by dominating the international debate, and taking the high moral ground on all the relevant issues, Oxfam distorted the debate in a subtle but highly significant manner.

A cease-fire would, of course, have prevented the RPF from stopping the genocide.

Oxfam's position was ultimately immaterial because of the RPF's military victory. However, the episode does bring up disturbing implications. What would have happened if Oxfam's campaign had succeeded?

Consider the most likely scenario if there had actually been an internationally supervised cease-fire and the dispatch of 5,000 UN troops to Rwanda at the end of April. The battle lines would have been frozen, with the RPF in control of less than half the country, and the government and interahamwe controlling the remainder. It is probable that killing, albeit on a reduced scale, would have remained endemic.

A cease-fire implies a search for a negotiated solution to a conflict. There could only be two outcomes. One is that the government and RPF agreed—in which case those responsible for the genocide would have been politically rehabilitated and awarded impunity for their crime. To expect a political settlement that included one set of the negotiators agreeing to surrender for trial is simply naive. The second is that both sides would have regrouped for war at a later date—war that would probably have been, as in Angola, bloodier than before.

Hence, while an unknown but probably modest number of Tutsis and Hutus opposed to the regime would have been protected for some time, the war would have been brought to a stalemate and Rwanda would have slipped into a state of permanent political emergency. International military intervention in the name of humanitarianism would in fact have contributed to impunity for genocide.

RWANDESE REFUGEES: HUMANITARIANISM UNBOUND

The refugee flows out of Rwanda were not the familiar unplanned flight of civilians caught in a war, though that element did exist. To a large extent they were the planned exodus of a population under the political direction of those responsible for the killing; they sought sanctuary abroad from where they could regroup and attack Rwanda again. Among the refugees were the principal killers, well armed and well organized.

The refugee exoduses from Rwanda were among the most flagrant abuses of international relief in modern times (500,000 refugees fled to Tanzania in late April and May, and almost 2 million to Zaire in July). The extremists who had mounted the genocide knew they could rely on the international relief community to respond with material assistance, and that there would be few if any efforts to isolate them from the rest of the population. They thus inflicted massive suffering on the people they had encouraged or forced to flee, and then extorted assistance from relief agencies, which they used to consolidate their power.

Most relief agencies and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) walked straight into the trap. Initially, in Tanzania, there was extreme reluctance to confront the predicament, and setting up a distribution system rapidly took precedence over removing or neutralizing the killers. Even when the trap had been recognized, and the agencies had started complaining, the extremists' ruse continued to work; they had the security and resources they required.

The extremists' strategy also worked in that it grossly distorted the international response to Rwanda. Until the refugee crisis in Tanzania unfolded in the last two days of April, the international media, NGOs, and Western governments had concentrated on the mass murder inside Rwanda. Relief agencies were unable to mount an effective humanitarian response because of the sheer danger of trying to operate in government-held areas, and their reluctance to start major operations in the RPF-held zones (largely for fear of compromising their neutrality). Hence the international debate had been largely at the political level—where it belonged. The refugee crisis changed that. All relief agencies had to be seen to respond. They sent teams to Tanzania and began work.

The conventional NGO response to the narrowly "humanitarian" emergency that the refugee crisis in Tanzania appeared to represent was wholly different from the politicized approach that had been beginning to develop in Rwanda. The response had the following characteristics:

- It was politically naive. In the camps, authority was delegated to those who had formerly held civil authority in Rwanda—that is, precisely the same people who had planned and implemented the genocide. This served the short-term need for efficient food distribution, but rapidly led to control of the camps by the militias.
- Operating alongside those complicit in the genocide made it difficult to condemn these people for their crimes.
- There was competition among the NGOs for humanitarian funds. Within the agencies, this

meant that fundraisers—who have a propensity to depoliticize issues—gained the upper hand over those who preferred a more nuanced political response.

Hence, though international relief organizations did not directly support the genocidal government inside Rwanda, the moment government forces had decamped to neighboring countries, the familiar synergy between an abusive authority and humanitarian relief was established. Failing to learn the lessons of Tanzania from April to May, the international agencies created exactly the same response, on a much larger scale, in Zaire in July. Some staff in the field pressed for a more politically informed approach, but were overruled by head offices.

The refugee crises once again demonstrated that, despite their efforts to move to a more sophisticated political level, relief agencies invariably regress to a basic, simplified "humanitarianism" when there is a crisis that can be—albeit briefly—presented in this way. The results of this regression: The issue of genocide was fudged. Combined with other pressures, the charitable imperative of responding to the refugees resulted in a rapid backpedaling on condemnations of genocide. Oxfam, which had made "genocide" its headline on Rwanda, now pushed the issue down on the agenda beneath the demand for an immediate humanitarian response. The issue was further clouded by the organization's refusal to name those responsible for the crime; instead it merely called for a UN investigation.

Why did this happen? Were agency staff so preoccupied with responding to the relief demands of the refugee emergency that they lost sight of the larger picture? Did the fundraisers dictate a depoliticized campaign? Did it reflect an implicit hierarchy of concerns (material relief essential, human rights a luxury)? Or did it merely follow relief organizations' mandate and instincts to concentrate on charitable works? (It was, probably, elements of all four.)

Another result: massive material assistance was given to the killers, including food, transportation, and a secure base from which to launch attacks into Rwanda. Ironically, while the soldiers of the new government of Rwanda remain unpaid volunteers, the genocidal army of the former government, now in exile, is fed by international food aid.

Moreover, some of the propaganda of the killers was reproduced and given a spurious credibility. This was specifically the case for allegations of abuses by the RPF, which were repeated by the UNHCR in May.

The final result was that, in their haste to address the humanitarian emergency in a depoliticized manner, the agencies helped to recreate political structures that very soon made their work impossible. By October the refugee camps were extremely violent. On November 3,

relief agencies signed a statement that said: "The current relief operations are untenable. Living and working conditions for refugees and aid workers in the camps are becoming unacceptably dangerous." The agencies went on to express their outrage at becoming "unwilling accomplices" to massive human rights abuses by the extremist political authorities, and threatened to withdraw unless there was "immediate and decisive action" for the better.

None of the demands have been met. But as the feared "intolerable" conditions have been realized they have been tolerated. This apparent moral elasticity is characteristic of relief agencies, which almost never close down their programs as a matter of principle—only Doctors Without Borders–France has done so in the refugee camps. Meanwhile the issue has been distorted, and presented as a technical security problem to be resolved by an international police operation. In reality, it is a political problem, caused by the men responsible for the genocide, who continue to organize their forces with impunity. An international war crimes tribunal has been established (belatedly) under the auspices of the UN, but the genocidal criminals are still at large.

THE DEBATE ON HUMANITARIANISM

Without material relief delivered by international organizations to the victims of disaster, the world would be a more cruel and brutal place, and many poor and marginal people would face a bleaker future, or no future at all. Human compassion is an essential component of a more humane world. But the limits of humanitarianism as a practical philosophy are becoming more and more painfully evident.

Something is terribly wrong in the provision of humanitarian aid, especially to Africa. There is little in the last 15 years that relief agencies can look back on with pride. A succession of cases—notably Sudan, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda—indicate that the humanitarian international has overreached itself. These histories show the hazards of multimandate operations by international relief organizations. The mistakes may have been made in good faith, but they must be acknowledged openly. To pretend that mandates do not conflict, and that humanitarianism can provide a political and human rights program, would be a dangerous dishonesty.

At the end of the day, relief organizations will always make charitable works their priority, which means that human rights concerns will be fudged or jettisoned. In the short term, some people may be fed or treated as a result—an outcome not to be despised. But this is at the cost of addressing more fundamental political and

human rights concerns. In the long term, more people will remain alive under more tolerable conditions if humanitarian relief is provided in a way that is consistent with basic human rights. The inconsistency is also demoralizing to those who expect an avowed stand. Further, inconsistency devalues the notion of human rights itself.

The hazards of politically blind humanitarianism are also considerable. A return to the restricted relief programs of the 1980s, so open to manipulation by abusive authorities, is certainly undesirable. If relief organizations had responded to Rwanda by desisting from any human rights statements, and instead merely sent relief to all quarters, no questions asked, they would rightly have been condemned as playing into the hands of criminals.

Relief organizations must find their new role. The first step is to open up the debate.

Rwanda is a good place to start. It is essential to learn the lessons of the international debacle of the response to Rwanda. This does not mean a standard evaluation of the efficiency of relief response, with recommendations for improving coordination, rapid response, and the like, but a thorough examination of the entire principles on which responses to political emergencies are mounted.

Resolution of the basic dilemmas is not in sight at the moment. What is important is to be aware of the realities of the dilemmas, and the past and ongoing failures and disappointments of the different approaches that have been adopted. Above all, it is important to realize that the enlargement of a charitable mandate into areas of lobby and advocacy on political and human rights issues is a major step with enormous implications. A commitment to human rights cannot be an expediency; the watchword for any human rights activism is consistency.

Above all, the examination must be conducted in public. The issues are too important, with far-reaching consequences, for the standard format of secretive, in-house evaluations to be adequate.

Many of the issues raised here have been discussed internally by NGOs, but few of them have been raised in public. Relief agencies appear to be frightened of a real public debate on many of these issues, fearful that it would strike at the myths that sustain their fundraising. They prefer to don their moral armor and insist that they did all they could for the best. But such arguments are no longer permissible for organizations that have such a profound influence on the politics of poor countries. These are real, pressing issues that can only be addressed if they are openly acknowledged. ■

"Somalia, Rwanda, and Mozambique have shown that the UN is an unwieldy, cumbersome, and often inept bureaucracy lacking accountability. . . The institution must be better organized if it is to cope with the rapidly changing and often dangerous situations that will develop in a world of complex ethnic, religious, and regional conflicts."

The Lessons of Intervention in Africa

BY SHAWN H. MCCORMICK

As colonial systems crumbled, the developing world became a flashpoint in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the cold war and the Soviet Union both now history, this portion of the globe has emerged as a critical proving ground for American foreign policy in a new era.

Africa has been especially prominent in this regard. Although the continent harbors no consistent threats to vital American national security interests, the United States has recently intervened in African countries on humanitarian grounds. This is something Washington can be expected to continue to do despite the desire of some isolationists to withdraw from the continent entirely. The United States has supported United Nations peacekeeping operations with logistical and financial assistance in an attempt to promote lasting solutions to difficult conflicts in Africa. Such aid could be extended to peacekeeping efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or subregional institutions like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

American engagement in Somalia, Rwanda, and Mozambique presents us with three case studies that will be crucial in determining the future course of American military and diplomatic undertakings. In each of the three instances American involvement was sparked by circumstances that seem emblematic of those in countries around the world experiencing turmoil.

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¹In a Chapter 6 (known as "Pacific Settlement of Disputes") peacekeeping operation, a cease-fire is in effect and the consent of the warring parties has been obtained before the UN force is deployed. In a Chapter 7 mission, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant enough that the UN deploys forces without a cease-fire or the consent of the combatants.

SOMALIA: NEVER UNDERESTIMATE A CONFLICT

The picture of virtual anarchy that dominated media coverage of Somalia in 1992 had its roots in a guerrilla challenge to the dictatorial and corrupt regime of President Mohammed Siad Barre. Clan forces in northern Somalia openly proclaimed their disdain for the autocratic ruler who had attempted, with great brutality, to crush their opposition four years earlier. Subsequent disturbances led to the near-collapse of the central government before Barre fled the country in January 1991. Various clan leaders then tried to rule through fiat as Somalia's economy collapsed and the country was struck by famine. Clan control of international food aid became a key to holding power in the new Somalia; a deeply divided and starving populace bore the brunt of this quest for power.

In late November 1992, President George Bush, compelled by the suffering of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, decided to send American forces to Somalia to secure the delivery of humanitarian relief. On December 3 the United Nations endorsed the American proposal, and the first troops of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) arrived just six days later. The immediate goals of the mission: establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations, and assist international relief agencies in distributing food aid to end the famine that was now killing thousands daily.

Although Bush's original intention to have all American forces out of Somalia by January 20, 1993 (Bill Clinton's inauguration day), was unrealistic, the United States made it clear from the outset that it intended to turn the operation over to the UN within a few months. After some delays, the formal transfer of command took place May 4, 1993. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), like the 1991 Persian Gulf War, was a "peace enforcement" operation under Chapter 7 of the world body's charter; before, UN military operations had been conducted under the peacekeeping provisions of Chapter 6.¹ The rationale in Somalia was

that the country had long ceased to possess a central government that the UN might attempt to supplant.

Up to this point American engagement in Somalia appears to have been coherent, simple, and well defined, but in reality the first significant error had just occurred. When the mandate under which American forces had been dispatched ended, the troops should have been withdrawn, because it was not in the national security interests of the United States to have its forces engaged in peace enforcement or state-building, which were the goals of UNOSOM II. This process of "mission creep" was the beginning of the end for international involvement in Somalia. UNOSOM II's role included efforts to disarm all armed Somali clan factions and to promote national reconciliation—efforts the UN was not trained for or prepared to conduct and that Somali leaders apparently had no interest in.

Somalia teaches a critical lesson: a plan to withdraw military forces must be carefully crafted around an end date or event (such as a passing of the torch to another force or to a newly constituted government); otherwise the tendency exists to perpetuate a mission beyond its original goals. UNOSOM I was so crafted; UNOSOM II was not. Without an end date or milestones to judge progress, many Somalis began to see the UN as a new colonial master. This perception was exacerbated by the lack of political dialogue between UNOSOM and the parties to the Somali conflict, which rapidly stripped away any veneer of neutrality and impartiality UNOSOM II may have had.²

Somalia also points up the important issue of whether or not American forces are vital to the completion of a UN mission. In Somalia, American forces were initially critical in securing the delivery of humanitarian relief, but they were not so critical when the mission shifted under UNOSOM II. And as one senior American military official involved in the operation said, "We took our eyes off the prize and got hit. Hit hard."

The United States ended up fighting the UN's battles when it decided to pursue clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid in retribution for the killing in June 1993 of 24 Pakistani troops. At this stage the UN was no longer simply providing access to food and rebuilding the country. It now sought to capture a specific man

and his top lieutenants for what it alleged were their actions against the United Nations.

In late August the United States deployed an elite Army Ranger military unit charged with seeking out Aidid. This was done not to promote the goals for which American forces were originally deployed but to uphold the integrity of UNOSOM II. On October 3, 18 Rangers were killed by Aidid's followers during an attempt to capture the clan leader. Despite efforts to reduce United States forces serving under UNOSOM II by the end of the year, American troop strength was actually increased in response to the incident.

After the deaths of the 18 servicemen, leading decision makers in Washington underwent a catharsis that led to Presidential Decision Directive 25, which was finalized in May 1994. This document outlines several areas for reform in both United States decision making and UN operations; its central purpose is to ensure that the United States uses, supports, and participates in peacekeeping operations effectively and selectively. The directive mandates a set of principles to be used in deciding whether American forces will participate in a UN operation, including consideration that the mission advances the interests of the United States, and that the risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered commensurate with the interests at stake. Three prerequisites, the directive states, must be in place before the United States engages in any future peacekeeping activities: a clear mandate and timetable for achieving set objectives; realistic criteria for ending the operation; and an integrated political-military strategy coordinated with humanitarian efforts.

Some critics say American involvement in Somalia was without benefit, but an estimated 500,000 Somalis are alive today because of President Bush's decision to intervene. Reports that the capital city, Mogadishu, is sliding back into quasi anarchy as the UN prepares to totally disengage from the country contrast with reports from elsewhere in Somalia that life has returned to normal. A bumper crop this year will also help sustain the Somali people. Their political future is less certain, however, especially with regard to the creation of a viable central government.

RWANDA: SEEKING DEFINITION

Before last year Rwanda was virtually unknown outside those circles interested in Africa or the preservation of endangered gorillas. Now it has become synonymous around the world with genocide.

In September 1993 the United States endorsed the deployment of 2,700 UN peacekeeping forces in support of the Arusha Peace Accords, signed the month before by the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government and the Tutsi-led guerrilla Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Some of the forces deployed were of superior military quality (those from Belgium and Ghana, for

²Even before the first American troops landed in Somalia, the diplomatic community had missed a series of opportunities to resolve the disaster through preventive diplomacy. Former UN Special Representative Mohammed Sahnoun has outlined three crisis points at which diplomatic intervention might have made a difference before November 1992. "There was no concerted action on the part of the international community at a time when good offices and neutral convening power might have helped the situation dramatically." See "Restoring Hope: The Real Lessons of Somalia for the Future of Intervention" (Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994).

example). Decision makers in various capitals saw these developments as sufficient to make Rwanda "a UN problem"—one they no longer needed to monitor carefully.

The first lesson of Rwanda is that just because a peace agreement exists and UN forces are deployed to "guarantee" the peace does not mean that decision makers can afford to ignore the country. Peacekeepers and a peace pact are two elements of a security blanket, but Rwanda has shown that they can be quickly pulled away—with disastrous consequences.

As with Somalia, there was a need to focus on preventive diplomacy, even though an accord was in place. Greater understanding of the personalities and issues in Rwanda could have led to diplomatic efforts to defuse tensions before they derailed not only the peace process but Rwanda itself, as up to 1 million people were massacred, mainly by Hutu extremists.

The reduction in UN forces during the initial stages of the genocide in early April 1994 had a psychological impact that cannot be understated. An April 21 Security Council vote to withdraw virtually all the UN contingent after several Belgian peacekeepers were butchered by Hutu extremists only emboldened those in Rwanda bent on eliminating their enemies. In effect, the action in New York abandoned the country to these murderous elements.

The Clinton administration decided in early May to reverse its vote on the drawdown of United Nations forces, but the world body's bureaucracy was unable to reintroduce them in a timely manner. It would be nearly three months before the first new UN peacekeepers hit the ground. Nor was Washington prepared to alter America's global military readiness to accomplish this sooner; doing so was not deemed to be in the national security interest. Meanwhile France unilaterally deployed several thousand troops in western Rwanda in late May. Seen largely as an attempt to protect the extremist Hutu regime and its supporters concentrated in this area, the mission ended abruptly when the RPF gained control of Kigali.

In contrast, most nations that contributed forces to the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) did so only after the RPF took the capital and pushed the remnants of the old regime into Zaire. Evidently many countries have their own version of Presidential Decision Directive 25; no nation was willing to commit forces to a situation where two armies were battling for control.

When more than 1 million Rwandans crossed into Zaire and hundreds and then thousands fell victim to disease in the makeshift refugee camps, the dynamics of the situation began to change: the question was no longer UN peacekeeping in Rwanda, but rather humanitarian intervention in eastern Zaire. It was at this stage the Clinton administration, reacting to the intense media coverage of the human catastrophe, decided it

was in the national security interest of the United States to help end the suffering of the Rwandan people. Overall American military preparedness was altered so that the United States and European command might lead a large-scale humanitarian relief operation for the refugee camps in Zaire.

Yet the Clinton administration had failed to learn a critical lesson from Somalia: Do not volunteer American forces for an ill-defined and open-ended commitment. As in Somalia, the duration of engagement and the goals to be accomplished in Rwanda could easily have changed, creating another case of "mission creep." Senior American military planners, however, were not about to let the UN determine the exit point for United States forces in a context where the only quantifiable items the United States military could realistically deliver were potable water and medicine.

With the last American ground troops withdrawn from Somalia only four months earlier, the military leadership developed its own definition of mission success: "stop the die." An end to the wholesale dying—not a date—would mark when United States forces would turn over operation of the refugee camps to private volunteer organizations. By late September the humanitarian situation had stabilized in the refugee camps, and the volunteer groups became responsible for the inhabitants.

The American military went in strong—at least 4,000 troops were involved in the operation—and quickly achieved the stated objective. Success was gauged on three fronts. The mass death that had prompted the American intervention had been arrested. Control of the operation had been fully transferred to private relief organizations in short order. And finally, no United States troops had been killed.

Most important, however, the recent negative experience in Somalia did not keep American forces from lending a hand in another African catastrophe.

MOZAMBIQUE: THE UN AND DONORS TO THE RESCUE

Mozambique may seem an odd member of this trioka of case studies, but it offers an interesting set of issues and lessons learned. The United States did not commit any troops to the operation to secure peace in Mozambique, an exercise that included more than 6,400 UN peacekeepers, but instead contributed financially to the overall peacekeeping effort and played a significant political role on the ground to ensure the effort's success.

The conflict in Mozambique was in many ways a vestige of the cold war. The ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which had come to power on the heels of the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975, established a one-party communist state in its attempt to develop the country. With assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc nations, FRELIMO pursued its

socialist programs without concern for cultural demands, traditional beliefs, or other local realities. The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) soon rose up in opposition, and with the aid of neighboring Rhodesia and then South Africa, waged a guerrilla war against the regime.

By the time a peace accord was signed in October 1992, more than 1 million Mozambicans had been killed; another 2 million were refugees, and more than that were displaced within the country. The accord called for nationwide elections and the formation of a single unified army. Both were tall tasks that the United Nations was asked to play a central role in accomplishing.

The UN's main function in Mozambique was to guarantee the agreed-on peace. It took more than five months for the first UN forces to arrive in the country, however, which delayed the implementation of the accords for a full calendar year. Even when the troops were deployed, they were underutilized and operated with no clear mandate.

Yet the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) is often extolled as a model peacekeeping operation. At the surface this appears accurate. The cease-fire held, joint FRELIMO and RENAMO military commissions were established to address matters pertaining to the armed forces, nearly 100,000 combatants were demobilized, refugees were repatriated, and an election was held in a nation that had never voted. But the truth is that the dynamic UN special representative to Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, benefited from a great deal of luck and the support of a well-coordinated, active donor community.

This is not to discount Ajello's role. He used political muscle to make sure timetables were met and prevented both sides from thinking of armed conflict as an open option; for this he became known as "the godfather." Ajello also understood the importance of maintaining flexibility in interpreting and applying his mandate as special representative of the UN secretary general.

But Mozambique clearly benefited from the nongovernmental organization community in place in the country. This proved critical in overriding a cumbersome UN bureaucracy that sought to stifle initiative at every turn and to duplicate the functions already performed by the private groups. Donors plugged leaks in the UN system by enlisting nongovernmental organizations in efforts ranging from clearing mines to providing supplies to cantoned soldiers. An important lesson is seen here: NGOs must be tightly integrated into any large process because they are often better placed, more highly regarded, and more committed to ensuring that a peace process works than is an unresponsive UN bureaucracy.

As with Somalia and Rwanda, the UN bureaucracy posed a significant barrier to progress on a regular

basis. UNOMOZ's logistical and procurement structures were ineffective and often lacking in accountability. Key stages in the peace and electoral processes would not have moved forward if the donor community had not enlisted the aid of various private and volunteer organizations.

Mozambique also shows that a UN peacekeeping operation does not need to be large and cumbersome to succeed. Most UN forces did nothing more than patrol major transportation routes; they were not integrally linked to the central elements of the peace process relating to the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of soldiers on both sides that was to lead to the formation of a national army.

Future operations should learn from Mozambique that a peace agreement must be subject to aggressive, if not intrusive, oversight. Mozambique demonstrated that signatories are reluctant to carry their own weight and will often do so only fitfully. As one diplomat in Maputo commented, "It is no use saying it is up to the parties to comply once you have committed a billion dollars or more to a problem. It becomes yours too."

Mozambique also makes clear that specific pressure should have been brought to bear on the military front much earlier in the process. Ever suspicious of each other, both the government and RENAMO wanted to retain a military option as insurance against potential problems in the peace process. This contributed to the delayed demobilization that erupted midway through last year into an extended series of riots and protests by troops. This potentially catastrophic situation could have been averted through more active engagement of the UN and the diplomatic community.

This point notwithstanding, diplomacy by the donor community was critical in achieving the overall goals of the peace accords. The donors bolstered Ajello in his deliberations with the two sides in Mozambique and with headquarters in New York. One dramatic example: in a last-minute breakthrough that saved the election and possibly the peace, the American ambassador, Dennis Jett, helped persuade RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama not to pull out of the elections that were already under way. If Jett, his staff, and other members of the donor community had not shifted into overdrive outside normal channels, the entire electoral process could have gone off track.

A final lesson from Mozambique: if the parties want peace, the international community can assist. As long as it remains part of the process, goals can be achieved—often through creative and nonbureaucratic means.

APPLYING THE LESSONS

Because of its global political position and military capabilities, the United States will often be called on to assist in averting or ameliorating humanitarian crises. Arguably, no other country in the world is able to deal

with human catastrophes such as the one that unfolded in Zaire last year.

The United States can contribute excess military equipment and supplies for humanitarian operations when appropriate, but countries facing a crisis should not expect Defense Department warehouses to serve as supply depots. Only surplus goods can be dispatched unless the president authorizes otherwise, and it is instructive to remember that the United States military can be fully utilized in support of such operations only when the president decides to alter overall American force readiness.

One lesson Congress has learned from American involvement in UN peacekeeping operations is that it wants a larger say in future actions. It inserted into the 1995 State Department authorization bill a caveat that the administration must notify Congress in writing five days before any vote in the UN Security Council on the commitment of American funds for peacekeeping operations.

The United States is currently obligated to pay for nearly 31 percent of all UN peacekeeping operations. This cost is borne totally by the American taxpayer. Calling this an unfair burden, conservatives in Congress have recently introduced legislation to roll back the share in some categories to 25 percent. While Congress complains, the United States is \$600 million in arrears to the United Nations for various peacekeeping commitments.

UN peacekeeping operations, one recognizes, are an effective means of promoting burden sharing. Other

nations still pay 69 percent of the total peacekeeping bill and contribute all the forces (unless the president deems it to be in the national security interest to have United States troops involved in a particular operation). The cost of "going alone" to far-off places is unrealistic, and the UN provides a useful mechanism that will be used continually.

But Somalia, Rwanda, and Mozambique have shown that the UN is an unwieldy, cumbersome, and often inept bureaucracy lacking accountability. In addition, it is in dire need of leadership. The institution must be better organized if it is to cope with the rapidly changing and often dangerous situations that will develop in a world of complex ethnic, religious, and regional conflicts. It is especially important not to separate military and political affairs from humanitarian and financial ones—as the world body has done in the past. Greater cohesion will help promote a more streamlined institution on the ground.

As for direct United States involvement in UN operations, the lessons learned are clear in light of the Somalia debacle. As one senior Clinton administration official said, "It is hard to imagine a situation where American troops would be deployed to Africa again in either a Chapter 6 or 7 operation." Opportunities to lead in humanitarian ventures, such as in Rwanda, are feasible, but no one wants to see a repeat of Somalia. The lessons from American participation in all three countries will serve as guidelines for American involvement elsewhere around the globe. They are ignored at America's peril. ■

"Two countries in North Africa attempted genuine political reform in the 1990s—Algeria in its domestic institutions, Libya in its foreign policy—and failed dramatically. . . The governments of Morocco and Tunisia neither attempted such ambitious reforms nor faced such serious consequences. Adopting the appearance instead of the reality of political liberalization, the two regimes chose to bank on economic programs they hope will produce dramatic improvements before they are forced to undertake more genuine political reforms."

North Africa: The Limits of Liberalization

BY LISA ANDERSON

In the late 1980s political reform was in the air in North Africa. Governments and citizens alike saw political liberalization as promising solutions to the economic stagnation and political malaise that afflicted the region. The rulers stood to gain better and cheaper information about their people and more popular support, especially financial support. For the ruled, reform would bring greater freedom and more participation in the decisions that affected their daily lives.

By the mid-1990s, however, both rulers and ruled had grown disenchanted. To some, notably the beneficiaries of past government policies, the proposed reforms augured too much change too fast; to others, particularly the disenfranchised, they were too little too late. Moreover, political opposition had developed in unanticipated and disquieting quarters; discontent had been mobilized not by loyalist interest groups but by groups based on the often painfully divisive cleavages of religion and kinship.

Halfway through the 1990s, it is apparent that supporters of political reform both in and outside the region's governments are on the defensive. As governments resort to renewed repression, and their opponents to coups and armed revolution, the liberal supporters of measured reform grow ever more isolated and irrelevant. Ironically, government liberalization policies fell victim to adversaries the regimes themselves had created; in revealing the depth of dissatisfaction with the regimes they also revealed the illiberal nature of the associations that had been fostered by decades of government policy.

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IMPETUS AND IMPEDIMENTS

For all the countries of North Africa, the imbalance between government revenues and spending that lay behind the reform efforts of the late 1980s first ballooned as a result of burgeoning domestic demand. By that time the annual population growth rate in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya exceeded even third world averages, and Tunisia was not far behind. The official unemployment rate in Algeria was estimated at 30 percent, and was probably far higher. In Morocco, well over half the new entrants into the labor market were unable to find work each year, and by the mid-1980s Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria imported over half their food needs.

As early as the late 1970s the nonoil exporting states of Morocco and Tunisia borrowed abroad to honor their commitments to maintain welfare and provide employment at home, and a decade later even Algeria joined the trend. By 1989 Morocco's foreign debt relative to GNP was larger than that of Brazil, and by the early 1990s the ratio of total debt to GNP was 48 percent for Algeria, 70 percent for Tunisia, and 106 percent for Morocco. Had spending not grown so much so quickly, the collapse of the oil market in the mid-1980s might not have had such a catastrophic effect, but when crude oil prices dropped 50 percent in 1985–1986, the North African regimes' position became unsustainable. In Algeria government revenues fell 21 percent and imports 35 percent that one year alone, and between 1986 and 1989 per capita GNP declined significantly in Algeria and Libya.

Under these circumstances it seemed unlikely that North African governments would be able to extract substantially increased sums from the international system, especially as foreign aid contracted with the end of the cold war. Thus they had to contemplate extracting more at home. This implied the creation or amplification of demands from—and obligations to—

actual and potential tax-paying sectors of society. To meet and defuse the anticipated demands, regimes undertook preemptive compensatory political concessions. This was the beginning of liberal reform, with rapidly emptying government coffers the impetus for change.

The regimes in North Africa proceeded cautiously, lifting press censorship while postponing genuinely contested elections, or holding elections without recognizing significant opposition political parties. In both intent and content, these reforms were designed not to inaugurate a system of uncertain outcomes—democracy—but to solidify and broaden the elite's power base, making possible increased domestic extraction. As the collapse of the one apparent exception to this approach—Algeria's democratic experiment between 1988 and 1992—demonstrated, these governments had no intention of being voted out.

In assuming they would be able to maintain control of the process, the governments anticipated their opposition would be equally cautious. Government policy over the preceding 30 years had discouraged the elaboration and differentiation of civil society in North Africa, and the relative novelty and fragility of class- and interest-based organizations in the private sector—whether professional associations, interest groups, labor unions, or student syndicates—was expected to mean that few organizations would take up the implied challenge in liberalization and actually contest government policy.

One type of association, however, proved far more powerful than expected: groups based on the noneconomic ties of family and faith, identity and ideology. For decades governments distributed resources to groups believed to be merely remnants of a disappearing past or clienteles beholden to their well-connected patrons. As a result, religious and tribal affiliations not only persisted through the era of state-led modernization but were often strengthened in penetrating the state and securing resources from the government. In Libya, for example, in spite of the official rhetoric condemning tribalism, family ties remained among the most effective devices by which ordinary citizens could protect themselves from an arbitrary and capricious government and gain access to the vast resources controlled by that government. Similarly, at the same time the Tunisian government was dismantling the country's independent labor movement in the 1970s, it was encouraging the proliferation of apparently apolitical Koranic study groups.

Tribal and clan networks thus blocked reform within the regimes, with past beneficiaries of state policy opposing innovations that threatened their

access to or control of state patronage. Islamist movements challenged the reforms from outside the state, labeling them inadequate to correct the profound defects of the regimes in power. In neither case did the opponents of reform espouse liberal values. The tribes and clans that had colonized state bureaucracies in much of North Africa were obviously illiberal—to them, the government openness and accessibility, and the individual rights and respect for law associated with liberal reform were anathema. The Islamists, though they were quick to take advantage of greater press freedom or opportunities to contest elections in pressing their case, were rarely great adherents of liberal democracy either. Few of the Islamist commentators on the incumbent governments went beyond criticism to address how an accountable government might be conceived, established, or maintained.¹ In short, liberal reform found few supporters in the region, and it quickly stalled, running up against the far larger constituencies for both self-preservation and more radical change.

ALGERIA: THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE IN SOCIETY

By the mid-1980s Algeria's economic crisis was probably the most acute, and its government's efforts to shift course, both economically and politically, were the most dramatic in North Africa. In 1988, conceding a negative growth rate, the National Liberation Front (FLN) regime abandoned its historical commitment to the simultaneous pursuit of social welfare and economic development. Hoping to stave off intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government undertook its own structural adjustment program, announcing cuts in consumer subsidies. After the army was called in to quell the riots that broke out throughout the country in response to the announcement, the government reversed course, reinstituting the subsidies and instead embracing political reform. A new constitution, providing for freedom of expression and association (thus permitting political parties), was adopted in February 1989. Within a year more than 50 political parties registered, including the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), the first legally recognized Islamic party in the Arab world. In June 1990 Algerian and foreign observers were stunned when municipal and provincial elections produced a huge victory for the FIS and a resounding defeat for the ruling FLN.

Much of the FIS support was a protest vote against 30 years of single-party rule by an FLN grown old and corrupt; the party's tenure in office had become associated not only with economic failure but with widespread corruption among the army and FLN elites, who had been the first and often the only beneficiaries of the tentative gestures toward privatization during the 1980s. For Algerians who operated on the margins of the formal economy—and some estimates put half the

¹Lisa Anderson, "Obligation and Accountability: Islamic Politics in North Africa," *Daedalus*, vol. 120, no. 3 (Summer 1991).

work force in the “black market” or “informal economy”—economic insecurity was exacerbated by legal ambiguity. The FIS was quick to exploit this, guaranteeing law and order where the government could not or would not; it provided, for example, policing of the illegal but ubiquitous flea markets where contraband imports from Europe were sold. The party’s attacks on official corruption and vice were both political critique and social commentary, and many in Algeria, especially the relatively well off, feared the prospect of the FIS in power at the national level.

When legislative elections originally scheduled for June 1991 were eventually held that December, the likelihood of an overwhelming FIS victory in the second round of balloting prompted army hard-liners to step in, nullify the vote, and hand control of the government over to a council composed of army and FLN stalwarts. The FIS was soon outlawed and tens of thousands of its supporters were detained in desert camps. The democratic experiment was over, and what would prove to be a civil war had begun.

Over the next three years 30,000 Algerians would die as the army attempted to repress an Islamist movement that splintered and grew more violent as it was forced underground. Efforts to end the bloodshed by moderates in both the FLN and the FIS as well as in the Berber-based Socialist Forces Front (which had garnered the second-highest number of votes in the canceled elections) have included a joint communiqué issued this January that called for an end to violence, formation of a national unity government, and new elections. Since, however, neither the military government nor the major military offshoots of the FIS were willing to disavow violence and embrace a negotiated solution, there appears to be no end in sight.

While the Islamists sought aid from kindred movements and sympathetic states such as Sudan and Iran, the Algerian government had the cooperation of the French, Spanish, Italian, German, and Tunisian security forces in the surveillance and detention of suspected Islamic militants. Under these circumstances reform was neither possible nor—in the eyes of the hard-liners in and outside the government—desirable. All efforts to create a more open and tolerant—and incidentally more prosperous—Algeria were stalemated as the opponents of reform on both sides chose to fight to the finish.

LIBYA: THE TRIBAL THREAT

Like its counterpart in Algeria, the regime in Libya had grown complacent by the late 1980s. Brought to power by a coup in 1969, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi made his mark as an innovative if somewhat idiosyncratic political leader willing and (thanks to his country’s oil reserves) able to stand up to the superpowers, particularly the United States. His theories of politics were outlined in a three-volume *Green Book* and

applied at home in the radically egalitarian political arrangements he called a *jamahiriyya*, or state of the masses, instituted in 1977.

By the early 1990s most Libyans were involved in the system of popular and revolutionary committees and congresses that was the *jamahiriyya* whether or not they really supported it; they were the mechanism through which government revenues were distributed to the general population. Although the *jamahiriyya*’s institutions had little or no independent legitimacy, patronage networks had developed in and around them, survival strategies in the face of Qaddafi’s notoriously arbitrary and unpredictable policymaking. These networks reflected the regime’s profound ambivalence about tribal politics.

Simultaneously celebrated as the natural unit of human society and excoriated as the source of corruption and favoritism by Qaddafi, tribes were the only alternative to the *jamahiriyya* he would entertain, and sometimes he went well beyond merely tolerating them. After spending hundreds of millions of dollars on equipment for what was supposed to have been one of the most sophisticated militaries in the world, the regime was reported to have distributed Kalashnikovs and other light arms to tribes loyal to Qaddafi—including, ironically, the Warfalla, who would later help foil the leader’s attempts at reform. Like the Algerian government, when Qaddafi decided to pursue reform he found himself constrained by clienteles and constituencies whose leverage was a product of his regime’s earlier policy.

As the cold war ended, the leaders of the *jamahiriyya* faced unanticipated dilemmas in foreign affairs. Challenged not only by Libya’s isolation from the West but by the rapid demise of the Soviet Union, they were also tested by the American-led campaign against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and 1991. Further isolation seemed to guarantee the collapse of an economy already suffering from the sanctions the United States had imposed in the early 1980s and the precipitous drop in oil prices. Ending the isolation required abandoning positions closely associated with the *jamahiriyya*, including its reflexive anti-imperialism, and Qaddafi’s careful neutrality in the Persian Gulf crisis marked the beginning of just such a shift.

Qaddafi also attempted to appeal to his pro-Western neighbors, portraying himself as facing the same domestic troubles. In March 1993 the Libyan leader, whose abhorrence of the Muslim Brotherhood dated from well before his assumption of power, once again lashed out at Islamist activists, inciting his followers to assassinate Muslim militants. The importance of the Islamist opposition in Libya, however, was quite possibly exaggerated by the government to discourage division within the regime and to justify generalized repression. In fact, this identification of an Islamist threat may also have been designed to gain sympathy

from the Tunisian and Egyptian governments. Muhammad Yusuf al-Muqaryif, the leader of the largest and most active exile opposition group, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, argued that the "Islamic threat was created by [Qaddafi] himself, so that he could say to neighboring and other states, 'Either me or fundamentalism.'" Qaddafi was allying himself with the region's status quo governments and laying the groundwork for abandoning his habitual support of oppositional or revolutionary causes.

Qaddafi's effort to reposition himself in world affairs was most apparent in his willingness to negotiate the surrender of two Libyan suspects in the December 1988 bombing of a civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland. In this effort to prevent imposition of United Nations sanctions (and later to have them lifted) in 1992 and 1993, Qaddafi demonstrated an ideological flexibility he had not shown since the mid-1970s. This shift was openly debated in Libya's state-controlled press in the months after the sanctions were imposed, obviously with the leader's assent; this was not the first time the press had been used to explore policy options and test public sentiment.² Unlike during his early years in power, however, Qaddafi was no longer the sole arbiter of policymaking. While former foreign minister and exiled human rights advocate Mansour Kikhia declared that "[although] there are now pressures in Libya to change policies, the larger truth is that Qaddafi holds all the strings, playing one group against the other," in fact the clienteles that had developed in and around the *jamahiriyya* limited the colonel's maneuvering room.

The revolutionary committees opposed normalization of Libya's relations with the outside world since this would diminish their influence as instruments of radicalization, and they appeared to find an advocate in Qaddafi's longtime lieutenant, Abd al-Salam Jallud, who was said to have opposed the surrender of the Lockerbie suspects because at least one was a member of his tribe. By contrast, a more pragmatic or technocratic faction associated with Qaddafi's brother-in-law, Abdallah al-Senoussi, whose members had benefited from the minor economic relaxation of the late 1980s, advocated surrendering the suspects to cement ties with the West. A third group, linked with several of Qaddafi's cousins, had counted on the regime's advocacy of a closer relationship with the Arab world and argued for cooperation with Egypt to lessen their

nation's isolation. Because the divisions within the regime were not merely policy or personal disputes but also concerned patronage networks, Qaddafi's undisputed talent for persuasion and his capacity to balance and counterbalance the personal advisers, military officers, and civilian technocrats who made up the political elite—his "control of all the strings"—proved inadequate to resolve the debate.

The fevered negotiations over the Lockerbie case in the summer and early fall of 1993 came to an abrupt end that October, when a major coup attempt was foiled. Several military sites were bombed, and more than 2,000 people arrested, of whom at least 12 were executed. The plot was apparently organized within the Warfalla, a tribe linked with Jallud (though not in fact his own) and well represented in the regime.

Perhaps not surprisingly in view of its apparent association with Jallud (who was reported to have been conspicuously absent among the plotters' planned targets), the attempted coup marked the end of all signals from Tripoli that it might be interested in compromise. The regime's tentative moves toward moderating its adamant opposition to Western influence in the world and devising a way to begin Libya's reintegration into the Western economy had been foiled by domestic opposition.³

The extent to which the governments of Algeria and Libya tied their own hands by creating constituencies and clienteles they could not control is striking. Perhaps because their oil and gas revenues had permitted unusually lavish patronage in the early days, perhaps because the role of these states in their economies had been so large it suffocated potentially loyal opponents in the private sector, perhaps because the changes they contemplated were so great, the two regimes found themselves unable to undertake the reforms they advocated.

TUNISIA AND MOROCCO: WATCHING AND WAITING

Unlike Libya, neither Morocco nor Tunisia had cast their lot with the Eastern bloc, and though popular sentiment during the Gulf War was not sympathetic to the American-led coalition against Iraq, the two governments took care to maintain cordial ties with the European powers. Unlike the Algerian regime, the governments of Tunisia and Morocco had historically been more reliant on domestic firms and private taxpayers for revenue and so had permitted private associations to operate to a far greater degree. Therefore they felt less compelled to undertake radical domestic reform, and both chose not to legalize their sizable Islamist opposition.

Although their track records as relatively pro-Western governments with relatively open economies required leaders of the two countries to take seriously the rhetoric of liberal politics, genuine structural

²For Western reports of these debates, which turned on the merits of abandoning the regime's cardinal commitment to Arab nationalism, see, for example, Chris Hedges, "Libya's Press Hints at a Westward Turn," *The New York Times*, June 11, 1992; and Susan Sachs, "Libya Woos West But Sanctions Stick," *New York Newsday*, August 5, 1992.

³On the coup attempt, see George Joffe, "Qadhafi survives the coup," *Middle East International*, November 5, 1993, p. 9.

transformation was still inhibited by widespread misgivings in the state apparatus and beyond. Thus both nations adopted the appearance of liberalism—of the sort where the government wins nearly 99 percent of the vote in elections.

In Morocco serious economic reform was pursued only from the early 1990s, after the government had rescheduled its foreign debt almost annually since 1985 and could no longer borrow overseas. Even then, however, Moroccan businessmen worried that privatization would mean little more than transfer of title from the public treasury to the privy purse of King Hassan—already one of the world's wealthiest people—and his court.

In an effort to match the economic reforms with apparently complementary political liberalization, King Hassan sponsored a referendum in fall 1992 endorsing a new constitution that delegated more powers to parliament and the prime minister. In a typical burst of candor, however, the king warned that this "delegation" of authority should not be understood as a "renunciation." Confirmation that no one had misunderstood came in a referendum in which the new constitution was approved by 99.96 percent of voters.

The monarch's continuing desire to appear liberal while retaining tight political control was also evident in his invitation to left-wing opposition parties to form a government after parliamentary elections in November 1993. The parties refused this opportunity to create what would have been the first left-wing government in 30 years because they objected to the king's reservation of the right to name key ministers. King Hassan expressed bitter regret and defended his refusal to relinquish control of the ministries, arguing that the parties lacked experience. He went on to create a Ministry of Human Rights and to release several hundred previously unacknowledged political prisoners the next summer—but not the jailed leader of the banned Islamist movement.

Although the accession of President Zine El Abdine Ben Ali in Tunisia in 1987 ushered in an era of marked political relaxation (the new president celebrated his first year in office with the boast that the country had no political prisoners), by the 1990s the atmosphere had changed dramatically. The Tunisian government kept a tight rein on political innovation, maintaining the appearance of liberalization but increasingly limit-

ing it in reality. While it pursued a rigorous privatization program and ruthless repression of Islamist opinion, it also issued a new electoral law in 1992 that, while permitting greater representation of the legal opposition parties in parliament, was expressly designed to retain the majority of assembly seats for the ruling party.

Should anyone have misinterpreted the import of Tunisia's political reforms, the election results of March 1994 were definitive. President Ben Ali ran unopposed for reelection—the ex-leader of the Tunisian human rights league, Moncef Marzouki, was in jail for attempting to present himself as a candidate for the post—and captured 99.91 percent of the vote, while the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally Party received 97.73 percent of the vote in legislative elections.

Tunisia claimed liberal credentials by establishing a Ministry of Human Rights, although Amnesty International charged that "there have been too many fine words and powerless human rights institutions. What is needed is real action—action that will actually stop human rights violations, instead of being no more than a public relations exercise for the government."

WINDOWS SHUTTING

Two countries in North Africa attempted genuine political reform in the 1990s—Algeria in its domestic institutions, Libya in its foreign policy—and failed dramatically. Both governments succumbed to pressure from hard-liners, backed by elements in the military, to resist the temptations of reform. The Algerian government now confronts armed rebellion and civil war; Libya's apparent calm comes at the cost of continued remorseless repression.

The governments of Morocco and Tunisia neither attempted such ambitious reforms nor faced such serious consequences. Adopting the appearance instead of the reality of political liberalization, the two regimes chose to bank on economic programs they hope will produce dramatic improvements before they are forced to undertake more genuine political reforms. It is not a policy without risks, for even paying lip service to liberal values lends them a legitimacy the regimes are not yet prepared to concede. Given what appear to be the alternatives, however, the risks to the governments must seem smaller than those of real reform. ■

"South Africa's accomplishments have so far surpassed most expectations, including those of the masses still waiting for tangible evidence that majority rule will deliver the benefits for which they struggled all those years."

South Africa: Putting Democracy to Work

BY KENNETH W. GRUNDY

An open, competitive general election is as good a place as any to begin—for launching a democracy and for analyzing the partisan political winds in contemporary South Africa. For the record, from April 26 through 28 (the 29th in some areas), nearly 20 million voters participated in South Africa's first nonracial national election. Nineteen parties offered candidates for the National Assembly (a legislature that also sits jointly with the Senate as a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution). Nine provincial legislatures were also elected.

The election was a gigantic educational exercise. Because only white voters and a limited number of Indian and "Coloured" (mixed race) citizens had any direct experience with national elections, people needed instruction in the mechanics and the meaning of the process, and reassurance about how the secret ballot worked. The electoral machinery—the ballots, 80,000 voting booths at 9,000 voting stations, 5,000 election observers (2,000 from abroad), and 190,000 election workers—had to be coordinated by a newly formed Independent Electoral Commission, which had been given just three months to prepare for the polling. The logistics became even more complicated with the Inkatha Freedom Party's last-minute decision to participate. There were glitches, but the election went off smoothly and without rancor. The world watched, impressed by the patience and tolerance voters showed, and the nation savored a well-earned sense of accomplishment.

The campaign, too, went well, though it was not perfect. The radical right and the militant left did not take part. Inkatha, at first critical if not hostile, did not join the process until one week before the balloting. It worked to undermine the election and to disparage the results. In some neighborhoods, townships, and regions, workers from certain parties could not safely

speak out. Even among the participating parties, a few local leaders sought to keep the "enemy" off their turf.

When the results were in, the African National Congress under Nelson Mandela had captured some 63 percent of the vote, winning 252 of 400 seats in the National Assembly; the Afrikaner-dominated National Party of President F. W. de Klerk was a distant second; and Inkatha had placed third. The ANC also emerged as the majority party in seven provinces, while Inkatha prevailed in Natal and the National Party in the Western Cape.

From afar this looks like a workable multiparty system. In reality, however, power is parceled out locally, and the picture at the local level sometimes resembles a checkerboard of one-party enclaves with little pretense of diversity. Nevertheless, internal monitors and foreign observers endorsed the election and declared it essentially free and fair. This, then, is the foundation on which South Africa's democracy will be built. In compliance with several multiparty agreements leading up to the election, including an interim constitution adopted in late 1993, South African leaders began the task of hammering together a viable system of government.

The first order of business was to create a national unity government that would guide the new South Africa through its first five years. Mandela was elected president by the National Assembly without opposition. Parties that had won 80 or more assembly seats were entitled to designate a deputy president. The ANC named Thabo Mbeki first deputy president, and the National Party chose de Klerk.

The new government is composed of 27 ministers. Six are from the National Party and 3 from Inkatha, including its leader, Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, who heads the home affairs ministry; the rest are ANC members. (According to the interim constitution, each party that received 5 percent or more of the vote was entitled to join the cabinet.) This lineup is very much the product of hard-nosed negotiations, as much within the ANC as between the eligible parties.

The provisions for minority party representation are a significant departure from the winner-take-all system

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normally associated with parliamentary government. The president is obliged to consult with the deputy presidents on a wide range of matters, but they cannot veto his decisions; similarly, he does not have to obtain the cabinet's consensus to carry out his central executive functions. However, the "consensus-seeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity," as a pre-election agreement put it, reflects a commitment to reconciliation and cooperation on the part of the parties.

The task of governing in the new South Africa has proved complex and vexing. Removing the legal superstructure of apartheid has been relatively simple, but apartheid's social and economic substructure and the ensuing tensions and inequities defy quick remedies. Delays in resolving long-standing grievances have provided ammunition for the government's critics and will contribute to further dissatisfaction and unrest.

UNITY AT A PRICE

South Africa's transformation has created popular expectations that would be difficult for even the most popular, practiced, and gifted government to satisfy. The idea of a government of national unity was adopted to buy time for the country's new leaders and to co-opt centers of opposition to the ANC. The ANC, realizing its governing policies would require sacrifices from the prosperous white community and knowing it needed the National Party to help implement these demands, agreed to bring the Nationalists into government; the personal chemistry between Mandela and de Klerk also contributed to the spirit of consensus. The National Party saw the new government as enabling its senior people to continue to play an important part in the power structure. Strictly speaking, the national unity government is not a coalition government. In the Westminster

model of parliamentary democracy, coalitions are normally fashioned when no party has a majority of seats in the legislature or when parties are so close in their goals and policy preferences they decide to cooperate to strengthen the government. In South Africa's case, the ANC has a solid majority, with 252 of 400 seats, but had agreed before the election to form a government of national unity for five years. And since constitution writing requires a two-thirds majority, the ANC must persuade additional legislators to support its proposals.

The National Party and Inkatha joined the government because they feared that if they stayed out they might be weakened and further marginalized, and

because neither wanted the ANC to have unfettered control of the state machinery. Yet they are not sure what their roles in government are to be. How critical can they be? How can they avoid being used by the ANC as a rubber stamp to legitimize the dominant party's policies?

Their early experience in the government confirmed their apprehension. The National Party and Inka-

tha charge that their cabinet members had their responsibilities reduced, and that ANC deputy ministers were appointed to "spy" on them. In some cases their objections to ANC policies were overridden rather than used to temper policy. And the principle of proportional representation that applied to cabinet seats was not extended, they contend, to parliamentary committees or government agencies. Critics believe the ANC has taken sole credit for the reconstruction and development program on which government policy is based. In short, the role and powers of the cooperating parties are being worked out on the run, and the minority partners are not satisfied with them. (In December Inkatha and National Party hard-liners separately be-



gan to press their party leaders to withdraw from the government and go into open opposition.)

All the parties are feeling their way through this transitional scheme. They do not want to jeopardize the current arrangements or the climate of national consensus, but they also do not want to be taken advantage of or to weaken their hand in any emerging constitutional order. As several commentators have said, it is not so much the results of the first election that matter, but what happens in the second election, which is set for 1999. All are deeply aware that how they perform during this transition will affect their long-range prospects for greater power.

For most South Africans, the first five years of majority rule are a test of the ANC. Social life, the economy, crime, political violence, jobs, and the environment will all be laid at the door of the ANC-dominated government, though the party has little control over them. The government must work around an economy and social order systematically constructed by the Nationalists over 46 years of apartheid. Nor does the ANC have total control of the machinery of state. The state security apparatus—defense, police, and intelligence—is still dominated by agencies and figures identified with the apartheid regime, and much of the civil service is occupied by entrenched bureaucrats who were given five-year job guarantees in the pre-election negotiations. Even if the ANC were free to install replacements, it and the black community would be hard-pressed to find qualified personnel for all top positions. And how is the ANC going to finance its costly proposals without bankrupting government or scaring off businesses? Health care, housing, and job creation demand funds that, if raised in the white community, might not only jeopardize reconciliation but precipitate the flight of capital, managerial experience, and technical skills.

RECONSTRUCTING AND DEVELOPING

The government's social and economic agenda is embodied in the Reconstruction and Development Plan. The plan has undergone many changes since it was first drafted before the elections, and is still being debated. In some policy areas the resulting document still lacks specificity. A good deal of the wrangling in government has been between ministries competing for larger shares of the budget and for priority among plan projects. During his first three months in office, Mandela identified 22 projects to get the plan started and build momentum for change, pressing for land reform, redistribution, and restitution; electrification; improvements in rural water and sanitation; free health services for pregnant women and children under six; construction of housing and clinics; and promotion of agriculture and industry.

Progress has been slow, but the plan is now starting to move beyond the draft white paper and joint

planning committee stages. But the desired transformation is enormous in magnitude, and cannot be brought about overnight, even in the best of circumstances.

Housing provides a good example. South Africa's housing backlog has been estimated at 1.35 million units. There are 9 million essentially homeless people in the country, most packed into the shack settlements that ring every sizable town and city. Squatters invade land set aside for low-income housing and delay construction. They occupy open land in affluent suburbs as well as near the townships, and have moved into empty buildings in city centers. Clashes between squatters and the authorities and local residents are commonplace. The government's plan promises 200,000 new homes every year for the next five years, but it is not clear what quality of housing it favors.

To add to the problems, millions of occupants of state housing refuse to pay rent and service fees; boycotts launched during the apartheid years have informally continued since the new government came to power. Moreover, in some townships law and order has collapsed. The culture of protest is entrenched, and to some still seems justified in dealing with local state agencies not yet fully transformed from their apartheid-era incarnations. Mandela insists that people start paying, but his pleas have not stirred compliance.

Mandela's first minister of housing, former Communist Party leader Joe Slovo, did his best to focus attention on the housing crisis, but just as his ministry was beginning to launch its program he succumbed to cancer in January. Slovo was the first cabinet minister to produce a credible plan for delivering on the ANC's campaign promises. In October and November he brought together government, financial institutions, construction companies, and civic organizations of residents and the homeless in a grand agreement for \$500 million in new housing loans to township residents; in exchange, the government agreed to indemnify lenders against the payment boycotts and violence where they are building. The housing agreement is a distinctively new South African social contract: holistic, integrated, and involving leaders from across the social spectrum. It is a model understanding leading in the direction of the emergence of "civil society." And the ANC sees private ownership and private entrepreneurship (corporate as well as individual sweat equity) as the engines of change, spurred by an aggressive state leadership that virtually told the bankers, either you take the initiative and exercise social responsibility or the state will step in and force you to attend to the needs of the disadvantaged. The private financial institutions decided to cooperate.

POLITICS AS INVOLVEMENT

In each vital policy area—economic growth and job creation, land reform, health, education, infrastructure, crime—comprehensive negotiations are going

forward that draw in almost anyone with a direct interest or who might make a difference. Difficult questions are wrestled with: What and how much is to be done? In what sequence? When? By whom? Who is in charge? Who is to pay? How much? The process has proved extremely time consuming, but when done carefully, it establishes a sound basis for cooperation and things are more likely to get done as planned.

Yet as South Africa stands ready to move beyond the strategizing stage, it is hampered by officials disagreeing with each other, jockeying for political or private gain, or dragging their feet because they oppose the development plan's outlines. Necessary government institutions have not yet been staffed, funded, or in some cases even established. Almost every existing government department must be reorganized, redirected, its resources rechanneled to meet the totally different tasks the government of national unity is setting it. In addition, too many local governments are ineffective, and chaos reigns in some provincial governments. Nevertheless, things are moving along, and where there are inspired leaders (Slovo was one, along with Kader Asmal at the Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry, Derek Hanekom at Land Affairs, Trevor Manuel at Trade and Industry, Dullah Omar at Justice) progress has been visible.

But President Mandela and his lieutenants must still call for forbearance and austerity. In his address to the national conference of the ANC in December, Mandela admitted, "South Africa is not yet out of the woods." Be proud of our achievements, he said, but remember that "democratic forces in our country have captured only elements of political power." Social change is taking "longer than the situation demanded." By and large the people have been understanding, and realize that revolution is difficult. The predicted grassroots impatience has been muted. But though the national unity government and Mandela in particular receive high approval ratings in public opinion polls, no one knows how much time they have before frustrations boil over.

Considering South Africa's history of violence between groups and deep inequities in wealth, power, and opportunity, and considering the ANC's commitment to making major changes quickly in the lives of the masses, it is impressive how a consensus has been forged. Tangible results have come slowly, but positive changes in attitude are apparent. The poor have not risen up, and whites have not deserted the country. The police and the armed forces have remained largely obedient to the new government's dictates. Political violence has been reduced, though ordinary crime has continued at previous levels, if not increased.

Government has worked to keep the people informed of and relatively engaged in the policy process. Mandela has gone into the townships and conducted "people's forums" to learn firsthand about citizens'

goals and grievances. At base, the most remarkable aspect of the new order is the transformation of political discourse. In this highly stratified society, the leaders of most groups support the reconstruction and development plan. This does not mean that they agree on all its provisions, but that they accept that it is necessary to work together, that the country's resources should be redistributed, and that significant social transformation is required to see South Africa through this transitional period. They may argue about how and when this can best be accomplished, but not about whether it should be. Thus the language of politics has, by and large, ceased to be ideological, and become overwhelmingly pragmatic (as, for example, in the debate over privatization and nationalization).

This mood change is likely to last for as long as the ANC and its top leaders display reason, integrity, and goodwill. Mandela must ruthlessly root out corruption and Stalinist tendencies from government and his party where they occur. If the people sense that officials are using their positions for private gain, the still fragile consensus in the country will fall apart. Interest groups will scramble to bring short-term advantage to their constituents, and cynicism will replace cooperation.

In October Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu attacked the high salaries officials were awarding themselves, quipping that the new government had stopped the gravy train only long enough to clamber aboard. At first his views were criticized by some in the ANC, but eventually Mandela forced pay cuts. At the ANC's national conference, the president challenged his party: "We need to launch a campaign to set the country on a new moral footing." He cited recent problems—corruption, nonpayment for services, the blurred line between legal and illegal behavior in public office, and the "rampant pillaging of public funds" during the final days under de Klerk. But awkward and possibly corrosive cases have embarrassed the unity government. Allan Boesak, recently named ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, was forced to withdraw after accusations that he had directed funds from European donors for his personal use. The immensely popular Winnie Mandela, the president's estranged wife, has allegedly been involved in dubious diamond deals in Angola. Joe Matthews, a deputy justice minister and Inkatha member, is wanted for fraud and theft from a trust fund in Botswana. Once regional governments get in gear, the opportunities for corruption ramify. How best should the central government oversee the regional governments without endangering federalism? Yet malfeasance at lower levels undermines the aims and achievements at the center, bringing all government into disrepute.

The ANC's style of governance requires a broad and deep pool of leadership relying on consultation, popular understanding, and mandates from below. For many ANC leaders, especially those tempered by the

struggle within South Africa in the 1980s, process is as important as outcome. Mandela warned the December party conference of the "danger that the organization could turn into a conveyor belt of government decisions." But there is also a danger that the ANC, falling under the control of populist radicals, could become "a force steeped in [the] resistance mode." The country is engaged in a difficult balancing act in which the people must identify with the leaders and the leaders must reflect the wishes of the people. This interactive style is unlike anything South Africa has ever experienced, but "The People Shall Govern" is a slogan many take seriously.

Yet the ANC lacks the pool of talent it needs to accomplish this, and the financial resources to build one. A large proportion of ANC activists have been drawn into government, and experienced leaders have had little time to identify, energize, and train a younger cadre of leaders. "We managed to get into government," one ANC official put it, "but it almost cost us our organization."

This leads to a troubling question: What happens after Mandela? The prodigiously energetic 76-year-old president stands like a colossus astride the political scene. But the competition within the ANC in the selection of a deputy president after the election, and events at the December party conference, reveal party divisions and the personalities vying to replace the leader. The party's national executive, which is relatively close to Mandela, is largely a coterie that ran the ANC from exile, plus a number of leaders brought in by popular acclaim at national party meetings. Those identified with the United Democratic Front (an umbrella organization of more than 600 local and national civic organizations) or with the most militant sectors of the party generally did not fare well in gaining top national positions, though they did better at the regional level. The lion's share of senior cabinet posts went to the "pragmatic" or consensus-building wing of the ANC.

Yet at the 1994 national conference a "leftist" camp of populists, led by trade unionists and spokespeople for militant youth, asserted itself. In voting for the national executive, delegates rejected the idea of a slate of nominees handpicked by Mandela and cast ballots for their own favorites; thus Peter Mokaba, former head of the party's Youth League, and Winnie Mandela, leader of the Women's League, garnered the third- and fifth-highest number of votes. The left is still predomi-

nantly outside government; it feels the ANC's leaders have given too much away to the National Party in negotiations, are not forceful enough in dealing with Inkatha, and are preoccupied with reconciliation and with appealing to foreign investors and donors. Government is moving too slowly, leftists say, in bringing the benefits of political power to the masses.

The leadership struggle between Deputy President Mbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa, the secretary general of the ANC, is a personality contest, not an ideological or a policy one. Ramaphosa eschewed a cabinet position (after failing in his bid for the deputy presidency) and instead took up the reins of the party to ready it for mobilizing the people for the local elections expected in late 1995 and then the 1999 national elections. It looks increasingly likely that Mbeki will be Mandela's successor, but most South Africans hope that Mandela will continue as leader. Simply put, there are no obvious Mandelas on the horizon. And the ANC is in sufficient ferment that the factional lineup can shift before Mandela is ready to step down.

AFTER DEMOCRACY, THE HARD PART

While last April's elections were a marvelous beginning, elections alone do not a democracy make; they are a necessary but not a sufficient component of the democratic process. What seems vital at this point—and ANC leaders recognize this—is that the government continuously engage in keeping in touch with its base.

South Africa's accomplishments have so far surpassed most expectations, including those of the masses still waiting for tangible evidence that majority rule will deliver the benefits for which they struggled all those years. The poor have not revolted, though the culture of protest is still alive and many are hostile to reconciliation. The whites have not fled, though many dislike a "black" government. The security establishment has not undermined government. The unity government has avoided major mistakes. But all this is what did not happen.

On a more positive note, politics has been transformed and a climate of consensus has emerged, with some important exceptions. Overall, it has been a good opening for the ANC-government of national unity team.¹ South Africa still enjoys a season of goodwill, but success will ultimately depend on the government's ability to implement the reconstruction and development plan, thus expanding the economy, reducing crime and violence, creating jobs, and providing services for its constituents. Failing these achievements, no government, no matter how committed and popular, can last for long without relying on coercion. ■

¹A more negative perspective is provided by R. W. Johnson, "Drift the Beloved Country," *World Press Review*, January 1995, pp. 8–11.

"Carving out political space autonomous from the state is not the same as having structured access to the state on policy matters—and all would agree that no structured access was gained with the political opening or the elections. The only forces with ready access to the regime, and profound leverage over it, are the donors, especially the IMF and the World Bank."

Stalling Political Change: Moi's Way in Kenya

BY FRANK HOLMQUIST AND MICHAEL FORD

Kenya's political opening in December 1991, followed by multiparty elections a year later, has not fulfilled the high hopes of its advocates or realized the deepest fears of its opponents. An authoritarian president, Daniel arap Moi, remains in power. His regime is today somewhat less besieged, but social and political tension in the country render assumptions about its strength shaky. And changes on the margins of state power that may prove of some consequence in the future have been set in motion.

BY POPULAR AND DONOR DEMAND

In the late 1980s the democracy movement in Kenya became increasingly vocal. An important aspect of this dissent was the fact that most Africans on the leading edge of the economy—large farmers and important business leaders in commerce and manufacturing—were from a different ethnic group than President Moi. Under President Jomo Kenyatta, Kikuyus (the largest ethnic group in the country, comprising about 28 percent of the population if ethnically allied Embus and Merus are included) were prominent in the economy while also controlling the government. When Kenyatta died in 1978 he was succeeded by his vice president, Moi, who is a member of the smaller (about 15 percent of the population), economically weaker, and less educated Kalenjin. Nevertheless, Kikuyus remained the most prominent Africans in business and agriculture and among the rapidly growing middle class in the public and private sectors of the highly statist economy. Although structure need not determine response, disjunction between the ethnic makeup of economic and social power on the one hand and state power on the other has contributed significantly to Moi's sense of isolation and political vulnerability.

The worldwide recession of the 1980s brought declining real incomes for most Kenyans, including the

largely urban, educated middle class. The men and increasingly politically assertive women of this class—with Kikuyus the most numerous among them, alarmed over the Moi regime's deepening Kalenjin ethnic bias—evinced a growing desire for the rule of law in the face of stifling repression. Middle-class alienation was mixed with widespread popular unease over the regime's ever more corrupt and repressive ways. Well-to-do Africans, especially among the Kikuyu, withdrew their support. Dissent grew as the popular political space narrowed, and many people from all walks of life sacrificed their personal safety and well-being, their careers, and even their lives to speak out against the regime. Religious associations, the most formidable nongovernmental organizations in the country, provided loose grounding for the democracy movement—if indeed it was organizationally grounded anywhere. The single-party apparatus became ineffective as a means of political control.

Internal dissent was the necessary fuel, and the withdrawal of foreign aid the tripwire, of the political opening. After the cold war's end, Western donors could be more flexible with allies like the Moi regime that it had supported despite spotty economic and worsening human rights records. In November 1991 Western public donors withheld more than \$350 million in aid to Kenya (including \$28 million from the United States), pending economic and political reforms. The Moi regime almost immediately pushed through parliament a constitutional change that had legally established the one-party state in 1982. Moi grudgingly granted the political opening while refusing to negotiate with the opposition on constitutional and electoral matters—a pattern in marked contrast with recent transitions from authoritarian rule in southern Europe, Latin America, and several West African francophone nations. For the Kenyan opposition and many organizations of civil society, a constitutional conference remains the primary item of unfinished political business.

The December 1992 elections were not carried out

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on a level playing field, though Moi had some success in raising the anxieties of smaller ethnic groups that feared rule by larger groups such as the Kikuyu and the Luo. Moi was returned to office with only 36 percent of the vote, but his Kenya African National Union (KANU) garnered 108 of 188 seats in parliament, placing the president in firm control of that winner-take-all body. The opposition did well in many town and city elections, but local governments in Kenya are inhibited by lack of funds and technical skills, and many would be hampered by the Ministry of Local Government, which has broad supervisory powers.

ETHNIC CLEANSING AS TACTIC

From just before the political opening through much of last year, Kenya experienced the terror of occasional state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing. Attacks on non-Kalenjin residents in the Rift Valley in western Kenya began in late 1991 after declarations by some Kalenjin politicians that people from other ethnic groups were not welcome there. The assaults—which came to be termed “ethnic clashes” in the Kenyan political lexicon—appeared to be carried out by “traditional warriors,” but these were warriors who had been recently trained and armed in a very untraditional fashion. At least 1,500 people died and 300,000 were displaced, according to a 1993 Human Rights Watch report. The regime did little to aid the victims, and often obstructed assistance offered by churches and other organizations.

The clashes traumatized Kenyan society. Ethnic tensions rose to their highest pitch since independence and talk of possible civil war was routine. Through the clashes, the regime brought “the Kikuyu question” to the surface. The government argued that the clashes were caused by the opposition, perversely casting the Kikuyu as perpetrators rather than victims. The public was skeptical, but in light of historical stereotypes portraying the Kikuyu as aggressive, acquisitive, arrogant, and powerful, the clashes were rendered somewhat more “understandable.” The negative ethnic stereotypes and accusations flying around served to devalue the victims and limit sympathy for them, even though members of other ethnic groups were also victims, including Luo, Luhya, and Kisii.

One might have expected the clashes to unify the opposition. Instead, mounting ethnic tensions inhibited unity and the opposition splintered as the clashes continued. At the same time, international criticism was muted by the rural and seemingly primordial ethnic character of the clashes, their episodic occurrence, and the absence of a menacing government security force.

The clashes worked a political miracle for the regime. They helped unite fractious Kalenjin subgroups while “opening up” land that would be taken over by some Kalenjin and driving likely opposition

voters out of Rift Valley constituencies. On a broader scale, they encouraged ethnic divisions throughout society, and provided a veneer of credibility for the regime’s claim that multiparty competition inflamed ethnic tension. The clashes also attracted scant attention in the outside world.

AUTHORITARIANISM MAINTAINED

Several government practices help marginalize the opposition in Kenya. Although the press is more free since the political opening, it is still constrained. Before, editors regularly received calls from top politicians and government officials complaining about certain stories, and “suggesting” how to handle new ones. Press operations were sometimes sabotaged or banned, and publications confiscated. Attacks on press establishments continued after the elections although they are less common now, but harassment of individual reporters, less visible to the public and the outside world, may be more likely. Editorial self-censorship is a fact of life, and direct criticism of the president in the newspapers is virtually nonexistent.

Punitive laws with roots in colonial history remain on the books and continue to be invoked, including the Public Order Act, the Chief’s Authority Act, and the Preservation of Public Security Act, which allows preventive detention for the most vague of reasons. There are few high-profile political prisoners, but the opposition is harassed. Meeting permits are frequently denied, making the opposition appear impotent and even nonexistent in some areas—an especially effective ploy during elections campaigns. This method also illustrates the alliance between the ruling party and the civil service, a holdover from single-party days. In addition, the regime has undermined the opposition by virtually purchasing some opposition members of parliament; opposition MPs have crossed the aisle to join KANU, allegedly for 1 million Kenya shillings or more.

The regime has openly linked allocation of development funds with allegiance to the president and his party, a strategy that works particularly well in poorer areas such as Luo districts, where people believe they have been deprived of development largesse. This helps explain the understanding between Moi and Oginga Odinga, the Luo head of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)-Kenya, before the latter’s death in January 1994. The two leaders made joint appearances at rallies, and Moi promised funds for select projects in Luo areas. After Odinga died this arrangement was curtailed by both Moi and FORD-Kenya leaders.

Most observers believe that high-level corruption continues in Kenya. A few egregious cases have received considerable press, but government prosecutions are few.

As the regime’s opportunities to dispense patronage

shrank with the onset of a structural adjustment program and fiscal crisis, the frontiers of high-level corruption shifted to the central bank and public land, and possibly to state-owned firms undergoing privatization. The central bank was used to funnel funds to so-called political banks, whose officials were apparently close to the president. Some of these banks, on the point of collapse, were shut down after coming under scrutiny by the International Monetary Fund. IMF officials were appalled at the central bank's practices and all but required the removal of its chairman, Eric Kotut. The new chairman, Micah Cheserem, along with Musalia Mudavadi, Kenya's finance minister, have been praised by economic reformers both in and outside the country. Despite their relatively weak position in KANU they have fended off hard-liners who resent donor-imposed economic reforms that eliminate some opportunities for patronage and ill-gotten gains.

The state security apparatus is a source of continuing anxiety. The political opening ended what *Africa Watch* in 1991 cited as institutionalized torture in the basement and on the twenty-fourth floor of Nyayo House, a government building in downtown Nairobi. But in mid-1994 there were indications the practice has been revived in Nakuru and in Nakuru National Park in the Rift Valley. There have also been persistent rumors about the existence of private armies in the employ of politicians close to Moi. Such armies, along with scattered pockets of the security apparatus, could lead to dangerous initiatives against political opponents of the regime. It also appears that amorphous "thugs" working for politicians or the security apparatus have attacked some opposition spokespeople.

Late last year Moi's government successfully broke two major strikes and kept them from spreading. The regime waited out a yearlong strike by university professors and a three-month one by doctors and dentists at public hospitals and clinics. In both cases the right to unionize and salary and workplace issues were raised, but the government conceded nothing. Meanwhile hospitals and universities deteriorated, and the poor, who could not afford private doctors, suffered enormously. The regime argued, without convincing evidence, that the strikes were instigated by the opposition and sustained by foreign money.

The regime in its pronouncements occasionally invokes nationalism (proclaiming, for example, opposition to donor-imposed "Western-style" democracy and structural adjustment policy) and developmentalism (maintaining that the development process requires loyalty to the regime). But the impact of both ideologies is diminished by the absence of serious regional threats to Kenya and by the severity of the state's fiscal crisis and the dearth of development funds. Currently the leading ideological theme might be termed "custodianship," referring to the regime's purported responsibility to maintain social cohesion at

all costs. This is not a new motif, but its more frequent articulation is in response to the newly legitimate opposition. The regime warns against a selfish and irresponsible opposition that it says is stirring up hatred of the government and sowing ethnic division and chaos. Only a vigilant and tough government, it warns, can maintain social peace and usher in economic progress. Although this rings hollow for those who rightly see the regime behind much of the ethnic tension in the country, for others the social and political breakdown in Kenya may lend the argument a note of credibility. At the height of the massacres last year in Rwanda, Moi advanced the rather remarkable argument that Western-style democracy had divided an otherwise peaceable population.

THE ELECTION AFTERMATH

With the official end of the single-party state in December 1991, the focus of the opposition's attention switched to internal relations. Differences between leaders Oginga Odinga and Kenneth Matiba, rooted in their respective Luo and Kikuyu constituencies, became too great to overcome as their Forum for the Restoration of Democracy gave way to Odinga's FORD-Kenya and Matiba's FORD-Asili (Original). Meanwhile Mwai Kibaki formed his own party, the predominantly Kikuyu Democratic Party. These parties practice limited internal democracy and possess only rudimentary bureaucracies. As the elections approached all major leaders scurried to buttress their standing as ethnic leaders in preparation for using that as currency in negotiations for positions within the parties.

The combined opposition would have defeated Moi in a reasonably fair election, but divided they fell. The opposition also gradually lost the moral high ground as its leaders became bound up in behavior that appeared to differ little from that of the ruling party. Name-calling and backbiting became routine. Despite initial denials, FORD-Kenya was found to have accepted money from Kamlesh Patni, indicted in the infamous Goldenberg financial scandal. Last year the mercurial Matiba temporarily closed FORD-Asili's party headquarters and carted away party files. He faces mounting opposition to his leadership—or lack thereof—in the party. Youth belonging to rival factions of FORD-Kenya have also engaged in several brawls, while the leaders are barely civil to each other. Meanwhile the Democratic Party appears almost dormant.

Just after the political opening the opposition was confident of victory over Moi. But as the vote approached, with opposition prospects becoming more uncertain, a frantic attempt to put together an electoral alliance between the Democratic Party and FORD-Kenya broke down over who would stand for president, Kibaki or Odinga. After the elections the opposition expected the Moi regime to collapse under the weight

of its own illegitimacy. But when this failed to happen a succession of initiatives were tried.

As the Rift Valley clashes continued, Kikuyu leaders felt compelled to unite to protect the community and, they argued, from that base lead the opposition. Subsequently, last June the three opposition parties attempted to coordinate their electoral effort through the new United National Democratic Alliance. This effort also failed to get off the ground. In August several prominent Luo (including Odinga family members) and Kikuyu leaders declared their intention to unite their communities and recreate the alliance that had gained independence for Kenya in 1963. But leaders from other groups attacked the effort as nothing but an ethnic cabal.

If opposition strategy has shifted greatly over time, opposition debate over tactics has become more focused. It reflects a search for an appropriate role in the new multiparty environment, in which the opposition and the organizations of civil society are accorded rights by the regime, but these rights are fragile. The desire to take full advantage of their newfound legitimacy and be forthright and critical of the government runs up against the knowledge that the regime can easily take away rights. Some argue that while political competition is not fair or all that it should be, it could be, and indeed was, much worse. One does not want to make the regime feel its back is against the wall.

The sense is that the atmosphere within the regime tends toward paranoia. A segment of the opposition calls for reassurance of the president mixed with criticism, through dialogue and reasoned discussion that might build trust among all concerned. Otherwise, they say, the so-called hard-liners may win out over comparatively moderate voices in government and reverse hard-won gains. But others believe, after painful experience, that the regime responds only when it must, and fear that those who offer reassurance and plead for dialogue are being co-opted.

Elites in the opposition also express a desire for political institutions that would afford them regular access to the state. In their view, carving out political space autonomous from the state is not the same as having structured access to the state on policy matters—and all would agree that no structured access was gained with the political opening or the elections. The only forces with ready access to the regime, and profound leverage over it, are the donors, especially the IMF and the World Bank. It is understood by business, agriculture, and labor that, as in the past, the best occasion to meet the state over policy matters is at budget time, when the government has an interest in consulting with the most powerful interests in society so as to head off major disagreements and forge a minimal consensus on what will be done. However, such ad hoc access frequently depends on personal relationships with key civil servants and politicians.

Another ideological strand in the opposition might be called the “new generation” thesis. This is an apolitical vision of political renewal without effort; it relies on a younger generation of competent, less corrupt, less ethnically conscious leaders gradually coming to the fore as older politicians leave the scene. This new generation will have been socialized outside the old KANU culture of corruption, sycophancy, and special favors. But socialization—even if it is different, and that is very debatable—is a slender reed on which to construct political reform when previous structures are still in place.

The new generation thesis is frequently articulated by professionals and other members of the more highly educated middle class, and especially by Kikuyus, reflective of their prominence in those categories. The Kikuyu middle class tends to define Kikuyu identity in universalist and meritocratic terms, seeing Kikuyus as comparatively less attached to their ethnic identification, more attuned to modern values and behavior, more competent, and less corrupt. But the new generation thesis is ultimately a declaration of ideological and political exhaustion. It is probably not a coincidence that it arose in tandem with the realization that Moi’s authoritarianism may be quite durable.

As for external pressure by donors; it appears that the government pursues, with some success, a two-track strategy toward the donors. After dragging its feet, the regime has evidently decided to adopt most suggestions on economic reform, while reacting more slowly to donor requests for progress on political reform. The donors believe they must give the regime credit for taking up economic reform. Democracy, human rights, and issues of governance are on the table in dialogue between Kenya and donors, but do not appear to be paramount in decisions on aid.

Despite donor frustration with Kenya, in December donors committed \$800 million in new aid to Kenya in 1995, including \$220 million in balance of payments support. The United States pledged \$18.2 million for health and population, agriculture, private enterprise development, and for programs supporting democracy, good governance, and human rights. The donors were generally pleased with the government’s recent adoption of several economic reforms, the lowering of inflation to single digits, and GDP growth for 1994 estimated at 3.3 percent. The United States remains anxious about policy consistency—which it considers necessary for investor confidence—as well as budgetary controls, slow reform of state-owned firms, and cuts in the civil service. Washington is also pressing for constitutional reform.

Other matters are of concern to the donors. The regime frequently reneges on commitments after donor decisions are made—two steps forward, one step back. For example, just after new aid commitments were made, the government announced that a very expen-

sive international airport (the third in Kenya) would be built in Eldoret, in the Rift Valley. This will cause considerable financial havoc, and it greatly concerns the donors.

HARBINGERS OF A NEW POLITICS?

It is argued that civil society is ultimately the best guarantor of democracy, its strength altering the balance of power between state and society. Although there are obvious dangers in ignoring social and class power apart from state structures, the level of development of a country's civil society clearly bears on the ability of the state to treat society in a cavalier fashion.

Kenyan civil society is comparatively strong for Africa because of the relatively advanced state of capitalism in the country, but it has weaknesses. Kenya's well-to-do are deeply split along the Asian-African divide, in addition to the ethnic divisions among Africans. Under British rule the Asian community was Kenya's economic middleman, the buffer between the village and the international economy, and subject to all the hazards of that unpopular role. As a result Asians have long believed themselves politically vulnerable and have looked to the state for protection, regardless of who is in power. Moi's regime has used the prominence of politically dependent Asians in commerce and industry as a counter to Kikuyu wealth and power. There are risks for Asians, however, in their current alliance with the regime. In October five Asians were murdered in Eldoret and Mombasa after leaflets accusing Asians of complicity with the regime had been circulated.

The growing strength of Kenya's civil society is evident in the rapid increase in the number of nongovernmental organizations that preceded the political opening but was also encouraged by it. The process was also abetted by donor decisions in the 1980s to aid NGOs as well as the state. The Moi regime was concerned by the trend because of the sector's prominent critical (and often Kikuyu) leadership, its significant financial resources, its international affiliates and allies, and the simple fact of its independence of the state. The tension came to a head in late 1990, when the regime rushed a bill through parliament regulating NGOs through a host of measures. The community of nongovernmental organizations sprang into action, networking, mobilizing donor support, and eventually creating a situation where the regime felt it must negotiate rather than dictate.

WILL THE DAM HOLD?

Trends since Kenya's political opening in December and elections are contradictory. In the short run the

regime has gained strength, in the sense that it faces less immediate pressure than it did before the opening in December 1991. The opposition is not massed at the gates but rather is divided, and for the moment contained. Meanwhile, donors are apparently willing to work with the regime despite their chronic frustration with it. Civil society, with its allies outside the country, was strong enough to force the regime to enlarge the political space but not strong enough to make the state significantly more accountable—indeed, ethnic cleansing was carried out during the political opening, through the elections, and afterward. If the old authoritarian single-party system proved unable to cope with dissent in and outside the country, Moi's adapted brand of authoritarianism with multiparty competition has held the line.

But talk of Moi's strength can be misleading. The regime has virtually no political legs in Kikuyu and Luo areas, and the continued use of authoritarian methods is an admission of weakness and illegitimacy. On the margins of state power the political opening has also emboldened civil society and provided incentives for greater organization, a more vigorous press and public criticism of the regime, civic education, civil society networking, and sectoral self-discipline. In other words it has allowed a degree of popular expression and organization almost unthinkable only four years ago.

The wave of speculation attendant on rumors of President Moi's poor health at the end of January shows how quickly the cards could be reshuffled. The next elections, which must be held by 1997, may also bring major realignments of opposition forces. A focus on the regime's relations with opposition parties also ignores the high level of social tension that pervades the political system, destroying trust and sapping claims to legitimacy both for the regime and the opposition. The sense of personal insecurity caused by ethnic cleansing and fears of rising crime rates and spreading poverty contribute to a palpable sense of unease, even dread, in Kenya. For this and subsequent regimes, success will involve more than besting the opposition. It will require progress in healing severe social and political divisions and shepherding a growing economy that tends seriously to the general welfare. Short of this, the opposition may be kept at bay while Kenya's society gradually disintegrates and the state crumbles.

Kenya is not on a sure path to democracy. But however compromised the current situation is, the political opening and the elections present crucial democratic opportunities. The question now is whether the opportunities will be further developed. ■

"Secession attempts, dictatorial minority rule, and power struggles have riddled postindependence Africa. . . . Despite such turbulent times, the legacy of empire has remained remarkably durable. However, two important changes may now strengthen those challenging this legacy. The first is the end of the cold war; the second the growing demand for democracy in Africa."

Africa's Dilemma: European Borders, Contested Rule

BY MARK N. KATZ

Africa has recently seen movement toward democratization. Whether out of the growing conviction that it is preferable, or the sense that political change is inevitable, several one-party or dictatorial regimes now permit a free press, opposition parties, and more or less "free" elections. Indeed, contested elections are becoming an increasingly common feature of political life in Africa. Of course, there are countries where progress toward democracy seemed to have begun but was halted when the ruling elites saw that this would lead to their removal. But these regimes are no longer so self-confident; they are very much on the defensive and appear to be weakening.

The demise of authoritarian regimes does not necessarily mean that democracy will flourish in Africa; authoritarian regimes have not been the only obstacle to democracy. The "legacy of empire"—that all the borders between African states were drawn by outside powers without reference to preexisting national, ethnic, or other boundaries—may become the most serious obstacle to the establishment and maintenance of democracy in Africa. Democratization often brings forward demands for secession or a realignment of existing patterns of ethnic relations. As a result, democratization efforts may not proceed smoothly and peacefully, and may involve internal conflict and demands for the alteration of the colonial-era borders recognized and maintained by the member countries of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

COLONY-CARVING

Africa's current borders were essentially established by the European colonial powers at the 1885 Berlin Conference. Borders between European colonial em-

pires typically reflected European power relations, while those within these empires usually reflected interest group politics in the home country or administrative convenience; they did not recognize African divisions and rivalries. Consequently, as African states became independent, many found that the inherited borders divided ethnic groups between two or more countries and enclosed diverse ethnic groups that, at best, had little experience of cooperation with each other and, at worst, had a history of strife.

Recognizing that the inherited borders were a problem, and fearing endless conflict over them, the charter members of the OAU decided that European-drawn borders must not be challenged. This decision was unanimously approved by the OAU and has been maintained, with two exceptions: Somalia, which claims territory inhabited by Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya; and Morocco, which claims Western (former Spanish) Sahara. Surprisingly, the independent African governments have been even more committed to maintaining the European borders in Africa than the Europeans were. The colonial powers had felt no compunction about altering them, but except for a handful of attempts (which were mainly condemned by other African governments), independent African states have made few border changes.

As a result, Africa has been remarkably free of interstate armed conflict over territorial issues. While there have been a few such conflicts, except for the 1977–1978 Somali-Ethiopian war, the ongoing conflict between Morocco and the Sahrawi liberation movement (POLISARIO) in Western Sahara, and the off-again on-again war between Libya and Chad (1973–1988), most have not been long or bloody. However, there has been substantial intrastate conflict on the continent—which the OAU has largely failed to prevent or resolve. Secession attempts, dictatorial minority rule, and power struggles have riddled postindependence Africa.

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Secession attempts are sometimes made by minority groups that form a majority in a particular region, groups who feel (often with ample cause) persecuted by the majority and unable to adequately protect their rights in the existing state. The dominant majority in the country as a whole usually opposes this desire for secession, not wishing to lose any part of its territory.

One of the greatest secession struggles occurred in Nigeria, where the Ibos, a regionally dominant minority, attempted to secede from Nigeria in 1967 and establish the Republic of Biafra; by the end of the civil war in 1970, more than half a million Ibos died. In Ethiopia, the Eritreans fought a 39-year war of secession after they were forcibly federated with Ethiopia in 1952. The clans of northern Somalia seceded from Somalia in 1991 and formed their own independent state, Somaliland; the clans of southern Somalia have not recognized this secession, but have not acted forcefully to end it because of their preoccupation with internal quarrels. Other secessionist efforts have included those in Equatoria (Sudan), Cabinda (Angola), Casamance (Senegal), and, during the 1990s, Zululand (South Africa).

White minority rule was, of course, the norm in Africa during the colonial era. However, there have been several cases in which a black minority has held sway over a black majority from one or more other groups. The most well-known example of this occurred in Ethiopia, where the Amhara ruled over Tigreans, Oromos, Eritreans, and Western Somalis, among other groups. This pattern of Amhara dominance survived the downfall of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and continued under the Marxist leader Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. It only ended in mid-1991 when the Eritrean People's Liberation Front occupied Eritrea and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front came to dominate the rest of the country—establishing a new pattern of minority rule.

In other cases, minority rule over a majority developed or intensified after independence. The British and the French belatedly attempted to introduce Western-style, multiparty democracy in most of their colonies as they were withdrawing. These pseudodemocracies, however, did not survive long in most African countries, where they were replaced by either one-party or military regimes. Although these regimes claimed to represent the entire nation, the president or leader usually gave key positions to the people he trusted most—his own ethnic group. As a result, the government and the army became increasingly dominated by this particular group; examples include the Marehan clan in Somalia under Major General Siad Barre and the Kalenjin in Kenya under Daniel arap Moi.

Many of the coups in Africa represent not just the replacement of one leader by another, but the displacement of the dominant ethnic or tribal group by another. Increasingly, however, the question of ethnic

dominance has led to extended civil conflict. The ethnic groups involved do not dispute the legitimacy of the existing state, and may not appear to challenge the legacy of empire in the obvious way secessionists do. But the combined actions of the antagonists in these civil wars often do challenge this legacy by the fact that they occupy different parts of the country, thereby creating *de facto* states that are more ethnically homogeneous than the *de jure* one. Examples of such conflict include the civil wars in Liberia, southern Somalia, and Angola.

Far from ameliorating ethnic conflict, the process of democratization has exacerbated ethnic tensions in several countries. For example, the unwillingness of Ovimbundu leader Jonas Savimbi to accept electoral defeat in Angola's 1992 presidential elections led to the renewal of civil war between Ovimbundus and other groups (mainly Mbundus and *mestiços*) in Angola. The assassination of Burundi's first elected president—who came from the long-oppressed Hutu majority—in October 1993 led to renewed fighting between Tutsis and Hutus in that country. Last April, the suspicious death of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu, broke a fragile Hutu-Tutsi power-sharing agreement and renewed the government's civil war with the Rwandan Patriotic Front, in which the Tutsi minority regained control of the government. This is not an encouraging trend:

A NEW TWIST

Despite such turbulent times, the legacy of empire has remained remarkably durable. However, two important changes may now strengthen those challenging this legacy. The first is the end of the cold war; the second the growing demand for democracy in Africa.

During the cold war, a constellation of factors propped up the legacy of empire. United States foreign policymakers feared that change in African states with non-Marxist regimes would benefit the Soviet Union, particularly secession efforts (such as those mounted by the Biafrans and Eritreans) or efforts to replace minority rule by majority rule (as in South Africa). In the 1960s and 1970s several self-declared Marxist regimes came to power in Africa, and the United States used overt and covert means to counter them; but even in Marxist countries it would not support secessionists. For example, Washington gave significant military support to one anti-government group in Angola, Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), but that group sought to replace the Marxist government, not create a new country. By contrast, no American support was provided to the secessionist movement in the Cabinda region of Angola.

During its heyday, the Soviet Union was a revolutionary power. It encouraged African governments to be pro-Soviet, and held out the Soviet model of develop-

ment as more appropriate for Africa than Western capitalism. Moscow also provided significant political support as well as more limited material assistance to movements fighting against holdout European colonial rulers (primarily Portuguese) and white minority rule in southern Africa. Where Marxist movements succeeded, the Soviet Union and its allies provided considerable security assistance, especially where these regimes faced insurgencies.

Moscow supported change in Africa, but change only within the existing pattern of states created by the legacy of empire. The Soviet Union generally did not support demands to alter borders or to secede; not surprisingly, Moscow did not want to see friendly regimes (whether Marxist or non-Marxist) grow unstable, fall from power, or reorient their foreign policies away from the Soviet Union. Indeed, Moscow not only indicated its opposition to many of these movements, but actually gave military assistance to governments (including non-Marxist ones) to suppress some of them. For example, Moscow gave the Nigerian government military support to end Biafra's independence bid. To weaken the anti-Soviet Selassie regime, Moscow initially supported Eritrean rebels seeking secession from Ethiopia, but switched to helping suppress this movement after the pro-Soviet Mengistu regime came to power in Addis Ababa in 1974.

Moscow was allied to one state—Somalia—that did not accept its existing borders but claimed territory in neighboring states. However, when Siad Barre tried to forcibly seize the Somali-inhabited Ogaden from Ethiopia in 1977, Moscow provided large-scale military assistance to the Marxist regime in Addis Ababa; Mogadishu then expelled all Soviet and Cuban advisers, and abrogated its treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

An important reason why the United States and the Soviet Union did not support the breakup of African states was because of OAU opposition to the idea. This superpower solidarity with the OAU did not result strictly from a sense of idealism. Each feared that if it supported secession in one case, most or even all OAU members would register their disapproval by moving toward alliance with the other superpower.

The end of the cold war has dramatically changed this. With Moscow no longer engaged in a global competition for influence with Washington, Russia is mainly concerned with itself, its immediate neighbors,

and the West. Not only has Russia ceased to oppose challenges to the legacy of empire in Africa, but by recognizing the independence of the non-Russian republics that seceded from the Soviet Union, it has helped provide a successful example of secession for would-be secessionists.

The United States remains a superpower. But since Washington's primary interest in Africa during the cold war was to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, its interest in and concern about Africa has declined. While the United States does not necessarily support challenges to the legacy of empire in Africa, it does not have a strong incentive to oppose them either. Thus, while the dynamics of the cold war led the two superpowers to defend the legacy of empire in Africa, in the post-cold war era there are no strong forces outside Africa that want to uphold it.

Similarly, opinion within Africa supporting the legacy of empire has also weakened from the 1960s and 1970s to the present. This has occurred through an evolution of African intellectual and popular (though not always governmental) attitudes toward democratization.

When the majority of African nations first achieved their independence, most political as well as intellectual leaders viewed parliamentary democracy as a Western model alien to Africa. The slow pace of parliamentary democracy worked well in countries where economic development was advanced; but, they argued, the tremendous need for African states to lift themselves out of poverty and make rapid progress toward development required urgent, decisive action. Western-style democracy not only impeded swift action, but also emphasized societal divisions. African nations, already saddled with ethnic, tribal, and other divisions, could not afford to create more divisiveness. An African form of democracy was needed that fostered "unity." And, it was often argued, the needs of a country could best be determined by a single party encompassing all the nation's different groups, or by an omniscient "great leader." The ruling party or the great leader, it was asserted, could unify the nation while a multiparty system would "artificially" divide it.¹

With regard to ethnic relations within African states, the views of African political and intellectual leaders in the early postindependence period were strongly influenced by Marxism-Leninism. Just as Moscow's goal was to create a "new Soviet man" out of the disparate ethnic groups that made up the Soviet Union, so it was the goal of new African governments to mold a unifying national consciousness for the disparate ethnic groups thrown together in artificially drawn states. But just as Russians dominated the Soviet Union despite Soviet rhetoric about the equality of all ethnic groups inside the country, African nations frequently became dominated by their "great leader's" ethnic group.

¹Kwame Nkrumah, the first postindependence leader of Ghana, expressed this viewpoint succinctly: "A people's parliamentary democracy with a one-party system is better able to express and satisfy the common aspirations of a nation as a whole, than a multiple-party parliamentary system, which is in fact only a ruse for perpetuating, and covers up, the inherent struggle between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots.'" Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964), pp. 100–101.

By the early 1990s, many in Africa had grown disillusioned with the early models of African independence. One-party, one-man rule had failed to bring about rapid economic development. For example, Ghana's charismatic Kwame Nkrumah promised modern industrialization and amenities; however, his efforts to bring these about resulted in economic failure. In addition, many of these regimes seemed more concerned with enriching themselves and their ethnic groups than their countries. Occasionally a vigorous leader did launch policies that benefited the entire country, but there was no mechanism for peacefully replacing these leaders as they aged and lost touch with the populace. Holding regular elections so that a country could periodically rid itself of a corrupt, incompetent, or simply unpopular leadership without resorting to force became increasingly appealing.

In addition, those ethnic groups excluded from power in various African states have become particularly disaffected with the often oppressive one-party, one-man regimes. Long gone are the initial postindependence beliefs in such regimes' promises to rule on behalf of all groups. Excluded groups have recently sought to end their oppression through democratization. This is especially true in cases where the oppressed group is the majority, or where there is a multiplicity of ethnic groups in which no single one forms a majority.

The present situation thus favors challenges to the legacy of empire to a far greater extent than was true during the cold war. Yet, while they may be unpopular and no longer receive external military support, authoritarian regimes are often strong enough to remain in power and suppress challenges to the status quo; such regimes are usually far better armed than their opponents, and do not feel constrained from exercising their advantage.

CROSSROADS

There appear to be four different outcomes to the aforementioned ethnic conflicts: voluntary integration, involuntary integration, secession, or chaos.

Voluntary integration of clashing ethnic groups within a state would see the groups resolving their differences to the extent that ethnic affiliation is no longer important. If this were to occur in Nigeria, for example, individuals would not identify themselves as Hausa, Yoruba, or Ibo, but would instead identify themselves as Nigerian. No one ethnic group would dominate the government or the military. Such an outcome is highly desirable because it would necessarily involve the peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict and would lay the basis for democracy. Voluntary integration, though, will be extremely difficult to bring about where ethnic conflict has been intense.

The involuntary integration of nations occurs if

either the ethnically dominant majority (or minority) defeats its opponents, or a previously oppressed group ousts the heretofore dominant group and rules dictatorially. This is the current situation in many African countries. But involuntary integration cannot be maintained as easily as it was in the past, now that the great powers are generally uninterested in supporting African conflicts, and the growing demand for democracy has made dictatorial rule increasingly unacceptable to oppressed groups. As a consequence, it has become less possible to establish or maintain involuntary integration through a sharp, decisive spasm of violence. The dominant group may have to apply force to maintain power.

In those instances where relations between a regionally dominant minority and the rest of a country have become hostile, it may be impossible to achieve voluntary or involuntary integration. In such cases secession may make democratization easier for both parties after the conflict between them has ended. Secession, though, can pose serious problems. Among these is the complicated question of where the new border should be drawn, since ethnic groups do not live in neatly segregated areas; drawing a new border (or re-establishing a colonial border, as Eritrea and Somaliland have done) can be fraught with conflict. Finally, secession is only viable where there is a regionally dominant minority; it is not really an option for a widely scattered minority group.

The fourth outcome is not really an outcome at all, but the lack of one. If conflict cannot be resolved through voluntary integration, involuntary integration, or secession, then it may simply drag on. The conflict between Arabs and black Africans in southern Sudan is now in its third decade. In Angola, the struggle between the Mbundu and mestiços (led by the government) and the Ovimbundu (led by UNITA) is about to enter its third decade. The fact that there is now peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea shows that long-lived conflicts can be resolved; but it does not offer hope that such conflicts in other African states can be resolved easily, and that democratization can make significant progress in such situations.

These four outcomes have very different implications for democratization. Voluntary integration would clearly lay a firm basis for democracy. Secession can also create the basis for democracy where it did not exist. By contrast, involuntary integration by its very nature inhibits progress toward democratization, and dictators are usually more interested in retaining power than initiating a political process that will probably result in them losing it. Finally, democratization cannot flourish while widespread conflict is under way (though democratization may be part of the eventual resolution to such conflict).

AMERICA'S ROLE

During the cold war, Washington's concern about the spread of Soviet influence led it to support the involuntary integration of countries under "friendly" dictatorships. As a result, American policy did little to advance democratization in Africa. In the post-cold war era, Africa is no longer strategically important to the United States. America, of course, has some economic interests in Africa, but these are minor compared to American economic ties to most other parts of the world.

But there are ways in which Africa's importance to the United States has grown. American concern about human rights issues has increased, as was demonstrated by United States participation in the UN effort to end starvation and bring peace to Somalia. Potentially more important is domestic political concern for Africa in the United States, particularly that of African-American groups; as African-Americans' political strength in the United States has increased, so has their ability to influence United States policy.

The end of the cold war allows American policy to view Africa from a new perspective. Africa's post-cold war lack of geostrategic or significant economic importance permits a degree of freedom and creativity in devising a new American foreign policy; America can now afford to be less concerned with geostrategy and more concerned with advancing the interests of Africans.

Promoting the voluntary integration of nations is an appealing policy to Americans because it matches their own domestic goal of creating a tolerant, pluralistic, multiethnic society. It would, though, only be effective where there is a desire for democratization and cooperation among different ethnic groups (as appears to be occurring in South Africa and Namibia), and in those places the United States government and nongovernmental organizations may be able to play a role. Helping organize political parties and free elections would obviously be useful—and there already is support for this through the United States Agency for International Development (AID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the various nongovernmental organizations they support. Equally important would be American help in adapting United States minority rights policies to the African context. This might include implementation of equal employment opportunity and affirmative actions programs, segments of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and other aspects

of American civil rights legislation. African-American groups (perhaps funded through AID or the NED) might be particularly effective in raising consciousness in African countries about the importance of safeguarding minority rights (and, in some cases, majority rights).

In cases where secession may be the only way to peacefully resolve ethnic conflicts and establish a firmer basis for democratization in the more stable successor states, American diplomacy could help negotiate a relatively peaceful divorce between the two sides. Washington can also play a role in establishing confidence-building measures, such as helping to resolve border disputes and other issues, and through the UN, organizing international peacekeeping forces to monitor the new border if necessary.

The most challenging situation, of course, is where there is severe ethnic conflict in which either the ruling group or a powerful nonruling group rejects democracy in favor of forced integration and dictatorship. Examples include Sudan, where the Arab Islamic fundamentalist regime is attempting to impose Sharia (Islamic law) on the non-Islamic black African population in southern Sudan (Equatoria); and Angola, where Savimbi has long attempted to gain power. In these situations, where a militarily powerful side refuses to negotiate, the United States may find it an option to provide arms to the other side so that it can put up a successful resistance.

Some may see such a step as abhorrent because it contributes to conflict. However, refusing to provide arms to the weaker side in such a conflict would signal American acquiescence to the triumph of whoever is militarily stronger and the establishment of an unjust, repressive, and undemocratic "peace." Arming the weaker side may lead to the creation of what I. William Zartman terms a "hurting stalemate"—a situation in which all parties to a conflict realize that a military victory is impossible—that continuing the conflict will not advance their interests, and that peaceful conflict resolution is the only way out of the situation.

Some may criticize these recommendations because they would damage American relations with many African governments. The question, though, which must be addressed by the United States and all those interested in American foreign policy toward Africa, is whether it should be America's goal to have good relations with Africa's dictatorial governments, or whether it should help the people of Africa achieve their aspirations for democracy. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

Long Walk to Freedom:

The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela

By Nelson Mandela. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994. 576 pp., \$24.95.

Nelson Mandela is one of the few heroic figures of this age; a man for whom principles matter, a leader for whom humility and honesty are not political expedients. His autobiography is an appraisal of a life lived in the pursuit of a basic freedom: to be treated as a man. That goal has been achieved, at least at the most rudimentary level, in the new South Africa he leads. But it was a goal with a human cost, one that Mandela paid for with 27 years of his life in prison and the disintegration of his family.

As the life of a revolutionary, *Long Walk to Freedom* of course charts the genesis and early history of the opposition to white rule. What makes this book special, however, is the human touch Mandela brings to it; politics, for example, is not something he chose as a career—it became a part of his life because to “be an African in South Africa means that one is politicized from the moment of one’s birth, whether one acknowledges it or not. . . I had no epiphany, no singular revelation, no moment of truth, but a steady accumulation of a thousand slights, a thousand indignities, a thousand unremembered moments, produced in me an anger, a rebelliousness, a desire to fight the system that imprisoned my people. There was no particular day on which I said, From henceforth I will devote myself to the liberation of my people; instead, I simply found myself doing so, and could not do otherwise.”

The philosopher Kierkegaard once said that “on principle a man can say or do anything and still remain inhuman and indeterminate; responsibility does not easily strike root, where everything is done on principle.” Mandela’s life story offers a counterargument, and holds out hope to those elsewhere in search of a leader who can be believed—and trusted.

William W. Finan, Jr.

Somalia: The Missed Opportunities

By Mohamed Sahnoun. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994. 89 pp., \$8.95.

Sahnoun, the Algerian ambassador who served as the UN special representative to Somalia in 1992, has written the best book so far on the international intervention in Somalia. He argues that the UN should have intervened much earlier in the crisis, and that when it did intervene, it was constrained by a cold war

legacy “felt both in the ineptitude of the UN’s structures and in the waste of its human resources” that exacerbated the Somali situation. This is a levelheaded analysis of what is wrong with the UN, and an honest attempt to help correct its deficiencies.

W. W. F.

Requiem for the Sudan

By J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins.

Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995. 313 pp., \$19.95.

This dense, well-documented account of the past decade in Sudan paints a chilling picture of a government indifferent to the suffering of its citizens; it also examines the frustrating problems that hinder international disaster relief.

Since the outbreak of civil war in 1983, famine and war have killed over a million southern Sudanese. The authors describe the horrifying manner in which drought and famine in the south were exacerbated by the government’s scorched-earth policies and restrictions on the return of war-displaced southern farmers and pastoralists from the urban centers to which they had fled.

Central to the myriad problems in Sudan is a cultural rift between the Arab minority concentrated in the north, which controls the government, and the largely disenfranchised Africans who constitute 90 percent of the population. The authors depict with disdain a series of leaders whose attitude toward the African majority has ranged from disregard to antipathy—the latter expressed in the obstruction of famine relief and the repeated slaughter of civilians.

Much of the book is devoted to detailing the challenges international humanitarian organizations have faced as they have tried to assuage the ravages of hunger and disease. Aid distribution has been hindered by the organizations’ justifiable fear of being caught in the crossfire of a war in which both sides suspect foreign assistance of benefiting the enemy. Other obstacles include a national leadership ambivalent about saving citizens it considers in rebellion and the reluctance of foreign governments to work with southern guerrillas.

Requiem concludes on a hopeless note. Having exhaustively outlined Sudan’s problems, J. Millard Burr, a former coordinator of “Operation Lifeline Sudan” for the United States Agency for International Development, and history professor Robert Collins, who has written on the country for 30 years, find it difficult to offer solutions.

Celeste Perron

The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948–1994
New York: United Nations, 1994. 565 pp., \$29.95.

For nearly a half century South Africa was one of the UN's major concerns, the focus of hundreds of condemnatory and punitive resolutions. This work, the first volume in what the UN calls its Blue Book series, collects these resolutions, and also includes an informative introductory essay (that provides cross-references to the collected resolutions), and a detailed chronology of events in South Africa up to Nelson Mandela's election as president. Researchers will find this an extremely useful work; one hopes that the other works in the series follow the standard set by this volume.

W. W. F.

ALSO RECEIVED

The New Politics of Population: Conflict and Consensus in Family Planning

Edited by Jason L. Finke and C. Alison McIntosh.

New York: Population Council, 1994. 276 pp., \$14.

What is the new politics of population? Who are the contestants? Is there any hope for consensus? This important book, published shortly before the UN-sponsored International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo last September, addresses these fundamental questions. Of its 14 highly readable articles, 6 are by experts in nongovernmental organizations that are demanding a major role in the implementation of population programs.

"Family planning programs have always been the subject of political-ethical debate," write the book's editors, who both teach in the Department of Population Planning and Public Health at the University of Michigan. On one side in the debate is the New Right coalition of conservative Republicans, elements of the Roman Catholic Church, Protestant fundamentalists, and other "right-to-life" advocates who oppose abortion, sterilization, and services to adolescents. They also work against United States-supported family planning programs overseas.

In the other camp in the debate are the international feminist movement and organizations such as International Planned Parenthood and the Amsterdam-based Women's Global Network on Reproductive Rights. Their chief aim, as the editors put it, is to "halt the oppression of women in all its forms, including the neglect of women's health, to establish women's rights, and to promote their status and dignity." The feminist

movement has emphasized the quality of care in implementation, demanding, for instance, that governments take into account the reproductive health of women when setting targets for population control. A chapter here deals with the influence of women's political action on family planning in developing countries, focusing on Brazil, Nigeria, and the Philippines. Another chapter posits that politics and research are inseparable in studies of fertility control, with politics affecting the frames of reference for thought in the field and research supporting politics by publicizing selected issues.

The 1994 Cairo conference demonstrated the need for much larger commitments from donors in the area of population, including reproductive health, empowerment of women, education of girls, and sustainable development. After a decade of isolationism and the halting of financial assistance to agencies involved in poverty alleviation and health programs in developing countries, the United States was about to restore the funding when Jesse Helms assumed the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The battle lines are drawn.

Rafique Kathwari

Civil Society in the Middle East, Volume 1

Edited by Augustus Richard Norton. Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1995. 328 pp., \$77.25.

That democratic government in the Middle East is an idea whose time will never come is something a small group of scholars has been working diligently to counter; this volume, edited by Augustus Richard Norton, bolsters their argument by showing that one of the necessary conditions for democratic government in the Middle East—civil society—has begun to germinate in the region. Its care and growth, of course, are another matter.

Norton provides an excellent introduction on how civil society functions in the Middle East. The chapters that follow examine economic pressures for more open government and the impact of Islamic fundamentalism on the political process; others look at the shape of civil society in Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Egypt, and in the Palestinian community. The essays are first rate, and are an important addition to the debate about democracy in the Middle East; the publisher's general editorial inattention, however, is extremely distracting.

W. W. F. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

February 1995

INTERNATIONAL

Middle East Summit

Feb. 1—In Cairo at the invitation of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat, King Hussein of Jordan, and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel meet with Mubarak to discuss the stalled Middle East peace efforts; it is the 1st time Israel has been invited to a regional summit meeting.

United Nations (UN)

Feb. 21—The Security Council agrees to allow Russia to export natural gas to Yugoslavia and the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo until April 30.

AFGHANISTAN

Feb. 11—The main factions fighting in the civil war, led by Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and President Burhanuddin Rabbani, agree to form a multiparty council that will serve as a temporary government; the council, which will have between 25 and 30 members, will oversee the disarmament of warring factions.

Feb. 14—The Taliban, a recently organized militia consisting mainly of fundamentalist religious students, drives Hekmatyar from his headquarters at Charasyab; Taliban's estimated 25,000 fighters control about 40% of the country.

ALGERIA

Feb. 5—The Armed Islamic Group takes responsibility for a January 30 car bombing in Algiers that killed 42 people and wounded 256.

Feb. 7—The *New York Times* reports that the government has returned militant Muslim leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj to jail; the 2 were placed under house arrest in Algiers last September in the hope that they would contribute to peace negotiations between the government and militant Islamists.

Feb. 18—Algerian security forces report that they have killed 5 Islamic militants suspected of the February 15 murder of Nabila Djahnine, the leader of a feminist group.

Feb. 22—Security forces kill more than 95 inmates during a riot by Islamic militants in a prison outside Algiers; 4 guards taken hostage by the inmates are killed.

AUSTRIA

Feb. 5—The Bavarian Liberation Army, a neo-Nazi group, takes responsibility for setting off a bomb today that killed 4 people outside a gypsy settlement in Oberwart.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Feb. 1—Bosnian Serb militias allow UN supply trucks to enter Sarajevo for the 1st time since July.

Feb. 6—For the 1st time in 7 months, hundreds of people are allowed to leave Sarajevo for the surrounding suburbs under the terms of a December 31 temporary cease-fire brokered by former US President Jimmy Carter.

Feb. 7—The UN reports that from February 1 through February 4, 62 helicopters flew into northeast Bosnia in violation of the UN ban on flights in Bosnia; the helicopters are be-

lieved to have originated in Serbia; last August, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic unilaterally declared an end to Serbia's support of the Bosnian Serbs.

Feb. 12—The UN reports that Bosnian Serb forces have launched attacks on the towns of Bihac and Bosanska Krupa in the Bihac enclave in northwestern Bosnia.

Feb. 19—The UN reports that fighting is continuing between the Bosnian government and Muslim rebels in the Bihac pocket.

BURUNDI

Feb. 16—The government announces the resignation of Prime Minister Anatole Kanyenkiko, who was ejected from his party, the Tutsi-dominated Union for National Progress (UPRONA) last month after accusations that he had fomented ethnic tensions.

Feb. 24—Refugees fleeing to Tanzania report fighting in northern Burundi between Hutu guerrillas and the army. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees says 24,000 refugees have arrived in the past week; there are now about 60,000 Burundian refugees and 500,000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.

CHINA

Feb. 25—Twelve leading intellectuals present the National People's Congress with a petition calling for the establishment of a constitutional democracy with independent legislative and judicial branches; the petition also calls for freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

Feb. 26—The US and China sign a trade agreement that averts \$1 billion in punitive tariffs that the US planned to levy against China for allowing the illegal copying and sale of US music and movies; under the agreement China will enforce intellectual property rights and patent, trademark, and copyright laws.

Feb. 27—Two more dissidents, Xu Wenli, who served 12 years in prison for criticizing the regime, and former student activist Wang Dan, issue statements calling for democratic reforms and protection of human rights.

CUBA

Feb. 1—The US begins relocating 7,500 Cuban refugees from temporary camps in Panama to the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where 20,000 Cuban refugees are already housed. The Panamanian government, which has allowed the US to locate the refugees on its territory while their requests for asylum are investigated, has asked that the US close all its refugee camps in Panama by March 6.

EGYPT

Feb. 19—In Cairo, security officials report that they are investigating 53 suspected Muslim militants for planning to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak and Prime Minister Atef Sedki.

FRANCE

Feb. 23—*Le Monde* reports that 5 Americans, 4 of them listed as diplomats at the US embassy, have been asked to leave

the country after allegedly attempting to bribe French officials to divulge positions on trade and political secrets.

GEORGIA

Feb. 5—The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has issued a report saying that the regime of self-proclaimed president Vladislav Ardzinba has engaged in a thorough campaign of "ethnic cleansing" in the separatist province of Abkhazia, *The New York Times* reports; some 250,000 ethnic Georgians have fled predominantly Muslim Abkhazia because of the campaign.

GERMANY

Feb. 24—Authorities ban 2 militant neo-Nazi groups, the Free German Worker's Party and the National List, after the Constitutional Court rules they are not political parties; 10 such groups have been declared illegal since 1989.

HAITI

Feb. 20—The government announces that elections for more than 2,000 national and local legislative positions will be held June 4.

Feb. 21—President Jean-Bertrand Aristide dismisses 4 generals, including army commander General Bernardin Poisson, and 39 army colonels and majors; since returning to office last October, Aristide has reduced the size of the army from 7,000 to 1,500 and has created a separate police force.

INDIA

Feb. 26—The death toll of Indian troops in a train explosion yesterday in Assam state rises to 27; 25 others were wounded; officials suspect National Socialist Council of Nagaland separatists of staging the attack.

INDONESIA

Feb. 24—The army acknowledges a "violation of procedures" by troops who killed 6 people in annexed East Timor province January 18 but says they were killed during a raid on a camp of the banned separatist group Revolutionary Group for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN).

IRAN

Feb. 28—The US says that Iran has begun a military buildup on islands off the coast of the United Arab Emirates near the mouth of the Persian Gulf; troops, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-ship missiles have been transported to the islands, which Iran occupied 3 years ago.

IRAQ

Feb. 15—*The New York Times* reports that Iraq is exporting 200,000 barrels of oil a day at below market price, mainly through Turkey and Iran, despite a 1991 UN embargo on Iraqi oil sales; Iraq has received an estimated \$700 million annually from secret sales.

Feb. 27—A car bomb explodes in Zakho in Kurd-controlled northern Iraq, killing at least 54 people and wounding more than 80. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have been fighting for control in the region since mid-December.

LEBANON

Feb. 26—*The New York Times* reports that for the past 2 weeks Israel has blockaded Lebanon's coast; Israel claims that the blockade is in retaliation for Lebanese government harassment of Lebanese citizens in Israel's self-declared security

zone in southern Lebanon; the Lebanese government has accused Israel of "political, military, and economic terrorism."

MEXICO

Feb. 2—The International Monetary Fund approves \$17.8 billion in loans for Mexico; the loans are to help Mexico bolster the peso, which was devalued in December.

Feb. 9—After announcing the discovery of Zapatista arms caches in Mexico City and Veracruz state, President Ernesto Zedillo orders a crackdown on the rebel Zapatista National Liberation Army in the southern state of Chiapas. He issues a warrant for the arrest of 5 rebel leaders, including Subcomandante Marcos, whom Zedillo identified as a former communications professor, Rafael Sebastián Guillén. In Toluca 14 suspected rebels are arrested.

Feb. 10—Mexican army troops storm the Zapatista headquarters in Chiapas, capturing 3 rebel leaders.

Feb. 13—In state elections in Jalisco, the conservative National Action Party defeats the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) for the governorship and the mayoralty of Guadalajara, most of the state's large cities, and 17 of 20 seats in the state legislature that are filled by direct election.

Feb. 14—Zedillo orders the Mexican army to stop its offensive against the Zapatista rebels, and asks Congress to consider an amnesty for the rebels.

Chiapas Governor Eduardo Robledo Rincón resigns; the state legislature elects PRI member César Ruiz Ferro to replace him. Robledo says he is stepping down in the interest of peace in Chiapas.

Feb. 17—The government rejects Zapatista demands that the army pull back from towns in Chiapas it occupied last week.

Feb. 20—A government human rights group, the National Human Rights Commission, reports that some Zapatista rebels captured in Chiapas have been tortured.

Feb. 21—The US and Mexico sign an agreement under which the US will provide \$20 billion in loans in return for a fiscal austerity program that includes measures requiring Mexico to run a budget surplus this year.

Feb. 25—Government agents arrest Othón Cortés Vázquez, believed to be the 2nd gunman in the March 23 murder of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in Tijuana. Cortés was on Colosio's security detail the day of the assassination, and has worked in various capacities for PRI candidates and officials in Baja California state.

Feb. 28—Raúl Salinas de Gortari, the brother of former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, is arrested for allegedly ordering and paying for the September 28, 1994, assassination of senior PRI official José Francisco Ruiz Massieu.

NICARAGUA

Feb. 21—General Humberto Ortega steps down as commander of Nicaragua's army as part of an agreement with President Violeta Chamorro; Ortega is the brother of Nicaragua's former Sandinista president Daniel Ortega.

PAKISTAN

Feb. 26—Police announce the arrest of 36 Islamic militants in a crackdown. Yesterday masked gunmen assumed to be Sunni extremists killed 20 people and wounded several others at 2 Shiite mosques in Karachi; 161 people have been killed in sectarian and factional violence in the city this year.

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY

Feb. 6—In the Gaza Strip, gunmen kill an Israeli fuel truck security guard and wound another; the Democratic Front for

the Liberation of Palestine claims responsibility for the attack.

Feb. 15—Palestinian police detain Raji Sourani, director of the Gaza Center for Rights and Law, for 16 hours; Sourani has criticized the creation of a Palestinian military court, fearing it would lead to the abuse of human rights.

PERU

Feb. 17—Peru signs a peace treaty with Ecuador to end a 3-week-old border war that has killed dozens of soldiers; the treaty calls for the US, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina to oversee the demilitarization of the border.

POLAND

Feb. 7—The governing leftist coalition nominates Jozef Oleksy, the speaker of parliament, to replace Polish Peasants' Party leader Waldemar Pawlak as prime minister; President Lech Walesa forced Pawlak's ouster, saying he had halted economic reform; Oleksy was a minister in Poland's last communist government.

RUSSIA

Feb. 1—In the secessionist republic of Chechnya, fighting expands beyond Grozny, the capital, as Russian forces continue to pursue fighters loyal to Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev; Russia sent in troops December 11.

Feb. 2—Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov, the Russian commander in Chechnya, says at a news conference in Moscow that Russia controls most of Grozny, the Chechen capital, and most of northern Chechnya.

Member of parliament Sergei Skorochkin is found dead of a gunshot wound to the head in a village south of Moscow; Skorochkin shot and killed 2 people last May after what he said was an attack by the local mafia. Two other members of parliament have been murdered since December 1993.

Feb. 8—President Boris Yeltsin names reformer Sergei Belyayev chairman of the State Property Committee, which directs Russia's privatization program; Vladimir Polevanov was dismissed from the post last month after publicly discussing the renationalization of the oil and aluminum industries.

Feb. 10—*The New York Times* reports Russia's official casualty figures for the ongoing war in Chechnya: 907 Russian troops dead, 3,400 wounded, and 456 missing in action. Officers have told Russian news organizations that the number of soldiers killed may be as high as 5 times the number reported.

Yeltsin dismisses 2 deputy defense ministers, General Matvei Burlakov and General Georgi Kondratyev; both had criticized the war in Chechnya.

Feb. 13—The Russian commander in Chechnya, Colonel General Kulikov, and the Chechen chief of staff, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov, agree on a cease-fire and exchange of prisoners.

Feb. 19—The government says Chechen rebels yesterday violated the cease-fire, which officially ended today, with an assault on Grozny from the south, in which, it says, 80 Chechen fighters were killed; Chechen officials claim Russia broke the truce by bombarding Chechen positions around the capital.

Feb. 21—Yeltsin issues a decree banning television, radio, and print advertisements for alcohol and tobacco products.

SERBIA

Feb. 20—President Slobodan Milosevic rejects an offer by the so-called Contact Group (US, France, Russia, Britain, and Germany) to lift trade sanctions on Serbia in return for Serbia's recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

SOMALIA

Feb. 27—About 1,800 US Marines arrive in Somalia to assist the withdrawal of the remaining 2,500 UN peacekeepers in the country; the pullout is to be completed by March 31.

UNITED KINGDOM

Northern Ireland

Feb. 21—The British and Irish Republic cabinets approve the so-called Framework Document, which is to serve as the basis for negotiations on Northern Ireland's political future. The plan proposes that Britain drop direct rule of the province, in effect since 1974, and turn governing over to a new elected Northern Ireland Assembly; it also calls for cross-border institutions, and for Ireland to drop its claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland. James Molyneux, head of the Ulster Unionist Party, the largest unionist group, rejects the plan, calling for a more gradual process. A cease-fire has been in effect in the province since September 1.

ZAIRE

Feb. 12—The first 150 of 1,500 UN troops assigned to keep the peace in Rwandan refugee camps around the eastern towns of Goma and Bukavu begin patrols.

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
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